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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the threat Boko Haram poses to Nigeria and its neighbors in West 
Africa, and determines the extent to which ensuing regional instability may or may not 
threaten United States (U.S.) national interests in the region. Among our conclusions, 
from the examination of U.S.-Nigerian relations over time, is that the United States 
generally acts in response to the media’s ability to incite a public outcry and less in 
regard to threats to perceived national interests. 
Boko Haram, initially viewed as a problem internal to Nigeria given its Nigeria- 
focused agenda, has since developed relations with influential transnational and 
international terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). It is our 
position that sponsorship from other terror organizations will make Boko Haram more 
dangerous and capable of threatening regional stability, ergo impacting U.S. security 
interests. On the basis of whether a terrorist group seeks state-level sovereignty or 
inclusion into an existing state, we propose several stop-gaps that, if applied effectively, 
could serve as countermeasures to hinder Boko Haram’s ability to move from being a 
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In May 2014, 80 United States (U.S.) military personnel deployed to Chad to aid 
in the search for nearly 300 missing schoolgirls abducted from their school in Chibok, 
Nigeria. The group, comprised mostly of Air Force personnel, had the timely charge of 
supporting the Government of Nigeria (GoN) with “intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance aircraft for missions over northern Nigeria and the surrounding area.”1 
That same month, a U.S. team of 30 advisors, experts in logistics, communications, and 
information sharing, also arrived in Nigeria to assist in the same mission.2 Both groups 
sought to provide the GoN with actionable intelligence in its goal of recovering the 
missing girls and addressing the decades-long insurgency instigated by Boko Haram. 
Since its inception in 2002, the radical Islamic group, commonly known as Boko 
Haram (BH), has been responsible for killing over 13,000 people, while displacing 
roughly 1.5 million residents, primarily from northeastern Nigeria.3 As a reference, see 
Figure 1, which depicts the intensity and locations of BH attacks from July 2009–January 
2015. Although these numbers attracted only episodic attention from the international 
community until the capture of the girls in April 2014, the lethality, frequency, and 
increased sophistication of the group’s attacks had been a significant concern for Africa’s 
most populous country and its neighbors for some time.  
                                                 
1 Katie Mcdonough, “U.S. Deploys Troops to Chad to Aid in Search for Schoolgirls Abducted in 
Nigeria,” Salon, May 22, 2014, http://www.salon.com/2014/05/22/u_s_deploys_troops_to_chad_to_ 
aid_in_search_for_schoolgirls_abducted_in_nigeria/. 
2 Brian Bennett, “U.S. Officials Frustrated by Nigeria’s Response to Girls’ Kidnapping,” Los Angeles 
Times, May 15, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/world/africa/la-fg-us-nigeria-schoolgirls-20140515-
story.html. 
3 Jeff Moore, “Boko Haram’s Resiliency Spells Trouble for West Africa,” Small Wars Journal 
(January 23, 2015): 2. 
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Figure 1.  Map of Nigeria Depicting BH Fatal Attacks4 
BH’s overarching aim is to eject the prevailing political establishment and 
supporting Western influence, overthrow the national government, and eventually 
establish an Islamic State (IS) in its place.5 The name Boko Haram is a combination of 
the Hausa-derived word boko, meaning “book” and the Arabic word haram, meaning 
something sacrilegious or sinful.6 Literally, BH means “the sacrilegious book,” but it is 
often interpreted as “Western education and civilization are sinful, ungodly, and should 
                                                 
4 Map of Nigeria depicting BH fatal attacks. The map depicts the number of civilian deaths 
concentrated between July 2009–January 2015. Will Ross, “Boko Haram: Regional Threat Spilling Out of 
Control,” Peace and Freedom, January 20, 2015, https://johnib.wordpress.com/2015/01/20/boko-haram-
regional-threat-spiralling-out-of-control/. 
5 Patricia Asufura-Heim and Julia McQuaid, “Diagnosing the Conflict: Grievances, Motivations, and 
Institutional Resilience in Northeast Nigeria,” CNA Analysis and Solutions, III, January 21, 2015, 
http://www.cna.org/research/2015/diagnosing-boko-haram-conflict. 
6 Abbeb Olufemi Salaam, “The Psychological Make-up of Mohammed Yusuf,” e-international 
relations, November 4, 2013, http://www.e-ir.info/2013/11/04/the-psychological-make-up-of-mohammed-
yusuf/. 
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therefore be forbidden,”7 thereby accounting for BH’s attacks on institutions that promote 
education and democracy.  
BH is also known for conducting frequent attacks on religious institutions. 
Specifically, attacks on churches are rampant in predominantly Muslim northern Nigeria 
and are often viewed by many in Nigeria as an attempt to provoke Christian retaliatory 
attacks to destabilize the government further.8 Unfortunately, BH’s actions are not simply 
restricted to promoting sectarian conflict. BH has also attacked Muslim establishments, 
most notably the Grand Mosque in Kano in November 2014.9 Such conspicuous attacks 
on Muslim establishments are customary for BH, which “accuses ‘the Nigerian Islamic 
establishment’ of failing to defend the interest of Nigeria’s 80 million Muslims” in the 
face of corruption and the perversion of Islam.10  
Islamic radicalism is hardly a novel concept and has existed in Northern Nigeria 
since the 1800s. This period witnessed the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate— 
the ruling Islamic order of the time—and the implementation of Sharia law in the region 
and in contiguous portions of West Africa.11 Indeed, as the colonial era began, 
confrontations with British forces prevented the Caliphate from fully instituting sharia 
law throughout northern Nigeria.12 A by-product of this confrontation has been episodic 
social and sectarian conflict between Muslims and Christians, resulting in existing  
socio-economic rifts.  
The effects of these fractures are among the many reasons for the social unrest 
currently witnessed in northern Nigeria.13 Also worth noting, since Nigeria gained 
                                                 
7 Salaam, “The Psychological Make-up of Mohammed Yusuf.”  
8 James J. F. Forest, “Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria,” Joint Special Operations 
University Report 12–5, May 2012, 2. 
9 Tim Lister, “Boko Haram Steps Up Attacks Aimed at Islamic Established in Nigeria,” CNN, 
November 30, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/28/world/africa/nigeria-boko-haram/. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Valerie Thompson, “Boko Haram and Islamic Fundamentalism in Nigeria,” Global Security Studies 
3, no. 3 (Summer 2012): 47–48. 
12 Ibid., 47. 
13 Hakeem O. Yusuf, “Harvest of Violence: The Neglect of Basic Rights and the Boko Haram 
Insurgency,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 6, no. 3 (September 2013): 376. 
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independence in 1960, northern Muslim populations perceive the state as coming under 
the control of the Christian southern populations.14 As unrest began to brew in the area 
during the late 1990s, the need for a charismatic leader to amalgamate all Muslims and 
represent the voices of the disenfranchised was widely felt. Mohammad Yusuf proved to 
be such a leader. 
Mohammad Yusuf, considered the founder of Boko Haram, provided clarity and 
cohesion to the disparate Islamic movements in northern Nigeria. He is credited with 
developing BH’s ideology, which targets Western influence in the region, promoted by 
the Christian-dominated government. As Yusuf’s influence grew, he encouraged the 
rejection of Western literature, teachings, and influence. Yusuf also established religious 
centers and schools in Maiduguri, and began preaching for a return to Islamic rule in the 
North.15  
The Nigerian military elite, sensing Yusuf’s potential to unsettle the North, 
established a joint task force (JTF) to counter BH. The JTF successfully captured 
Mohammad Yusuf in 2009; unfortunately, Yusuf inexplicably died in captivity, 
prompting followers to believe the government murdered him.16 This event, coupled with 
security forces killing or displacing thousands of Nigerian Muslims, is credited with 
swelling BH’s ranks, leading to the installation of an even more radical leadership 
structure led by Yusuf’s successor, Abubakar Shekau.17 Abubakar Shekau revitalized the 
organization and embarked on a campaign of terror designed to increase BH’s notoriety 
throughout West Africa.  
Attempts by the Nigerian government to capture Shekau have thus far failed, 
resulting in false reports of his death on several occasions. One such incident occurred in 
                                                 
14 Babjee Pothuraju, “Boko Haram’s Persistent Threat in Nigeria,” Institute for Defence Studies and 
Analysis, 3–7, 2012, http://www.idsa.in/backgrounder/BokoHaramsPersistentThreatInNigeria_BabjePoth 
uraju_190312. 
15 Thompson, “Boko Haram and Islamic Fundamentalism in Nigeria,” 51. 
16 Pothuraju, “Boko Haram’s Persistent Threat in Nigeria,” 3. 
17 Jacob Zenn, “Ansaru: A Profile of Nigeria’s Newest Jihadi Movement,” Terrorism Monitor 11, no. 
1 (January 2013), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40287&c 
Hash=bd00ee2691b7992de9fe4f8e2241841a#.VT_lOFyRafQ. 
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October 2014, when media reports indicated that combined Nigerian and Cameroonian 
forces killed Shekau during a raid in Cameroon. Within days, Shekau re-emerged and re-
affirmed his pledge to challenge the Nigerian government with renewed vigor.18 With 
Shekau at the helm, BH has created an organization capable of sustaining regional unrest 
by maintaining relations with other Al-Qaeda (AQ) affiliates, consequently expanding its 
profile beyond the borders of Nigeria.19 
Organizationally, BH is comprised of several dissident factions, to include 
Jama’atu Ansaril Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan, commonly known as Ansaru.20 Ansaru 
emerged in 2012 and is often hailed as the “most imminent threat to foreign interests in 
Nigeria”21 because of its close alliance with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA).22 Although Ansaru 
and BH are distinguished by ideological, tactical, and geographical differences and 
sometimes have strained relations, Shekau has worked diligently behind the scenes to 
consolidate his organization in the face of an organized offensive by the Nigerian military 
and its neighbors.23 In March 2015, Shekau successfully brought Ansaru and other 
dissident groups under the BH umbrella, establishing himself as sole ruler. Soon after, 
Shekau swore bayat (allegiance) to Abu-Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic 
State, elevating his “stature and legitimacy in the international Jihadist arena and re-
affirmed his role as the BH’s sole leader with respect to other factions in Nigeria and 
West Africa.”24  
                                                 
18 Adam Taylor, “Dead’ Boko Haram Leader Tells Nigeria: ‘I’m Still Alive’,” Washington Post, 
October 2, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/10/02/dead-boko-haram-
leader-tells-nigeria-im-still-alive/. 




23 Jacob Zenn, “A Biography of Boko Haram and the Bay’a to Al-Baghdadi,” CTC Sentinel 8, no. 3 




Collusion between ISIS and BH is likely to force BH to adjust its tactics and its 
local focus. BH has often been criticized for its exclusively domestic agenda, although it 
has attacked international targets, such as the United Nations (U.N.) building in Abuja in 
August 2011.25 In fact, it was this attack in Abuja that elevated the group onto the world 
stage and drove the head of the U.S. House of Representative Homeland Security 
Committee (HHSC) to comment that the Abuja attack “signaled a threat to U.S. and 
Western interest[s].”26 As a result, the U.S. Congress introduced the Boko Haram 
Terrorist Designation Act on January 31, 2013, which labeled BH as a Foreign Terrorist 
organization.27 
As for why the United States should be sufficiently concerned with the growing 
insecurity and instability in Nigeria to send advisors to Chad and Nigeria, there are 
several reasons. Among them: U.S. interests throughout West Africa are inextricably 
linked with those of Nigeria, a key U.S. ally that not only boasts the largest population in 
Africa, but also consistently plays the role of African regional hegemon. Nigeria is a key 
member of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) and the largest producer of crude oil on the African continent. In April 2010, 
the United States and Nigeria signed the U.S.-Nigeria Bilateral Commission agreement as 
a mechanism to address issues of transparency, energy and power, food security, and 
regional security.28 The bilateral agreement represents the U.S.’s commitment to engage 
existing regional powers in strategic dialogue.29  
In 2012, Nigeria temporarily became the world’s fourth leading exporter of 
liquefied natural gas (LNG)30 and provided over 15% of the oil consumed in the United 
                                                 
25 Forest, “Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria,” XIII. 
26 Caitling Poling, “U.S. Congress and Boko Haram,” Foreign Policy Initiative, October 13, 2013, 
http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/us-congress-and-boko-haram. 
27 Boko Haram Terrorist Designation Act of 2013 (S. 198), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/ 
113/s198#summary/libraryofcongress. 
28 “U.S. Political Counselor Discusses Foreign Policy and Bilateral Relationship with Nigeria’s 
Ahmadu Bello University Students,” Targeted News Service, January 25, 2011, http://search.proquest.com/ 
docview/849364321?accountid=12702. 
29 Ibid. 
30 “Independent Energy Data and Analysis,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, updated 
December 30, 2013, http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=NI. 
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States.31 Nigeria is also one of the world’s largest contributors to U.N. peacekeeping 
efforts and is the single largest troop donor in Africa. Nigeria has deployed soldiers to 
trouble spots in West and Central Africa, and Darfur, and played a central role in 
returning Sierra Leone and Liberia to stability.32 For these reasons alone, strengthening 
the existing relationship with Nigeria—a democratic, multi-ethnic, multi-religious state 
governed by the rule of law—would seem to be in the interests of the United States, 
Africa, and the international community.33  
Boko Haram’s emergence and the insurgency in Nigeria are worrisome because 
the unrest has the potential to leave lasting scars on the Nigerian economy. Economically, 
the actions of BH, along with other militant groups such as the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), have reduced the country’s oil production, 
displacing Nigeria from 5th to 8th on the list of America’s largest foreign oil suppliers.34 
This reduction can be viewed as a referendum on the Nigerian security apparatus, a 
concern shared by foreign investors who are increasingly wary about investing in an 
unstable state. Through crafty messaging depicting BH’s skill in attacks, and by 
publicizing the torture and killing of its adversaries, BH’s activities have discouraged not 
only investors, but also the Nigerian military from direct confrontation.35 Accounts of 
soldiers dropping weapons and fleeing instead of facing BH are frequently reported, 
diminishing Nigerian’s faith in their government. 
 
 
                                                 
31 Levi A. Nwachuku, “The United States and Nigeria1960 to 1987: Anatomy of a Pragmatic 
Relationship,” Journal of Black Studies 28, no. 5 (May 1998): 584, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2784795. 
32 Africa: Examining the U.S.-Nigeria Relationship in a Time of Transition, Testimony before the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs by Johnnie Carson Assistant 
Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs Opening Statement, April 2010, http://search.proquest.com/docview/ 
189997412?accountid=12702. 
33 John Campbell, “U.S.-Nigeria Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 2010, http:// 
search.proquest.com/docview/831089025?accountid=12702. 
34 “Independent Statistics and Analysis,” U.S. Energy Administration, Updated December 30, 2013. 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=NI. 
35 Hussein Solomon, “Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria: Responding to Boko Haram,” The RUSI Journal 
157, no. 4 (2012): 9, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2012.714183. 
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BH’s strategy and messaging bear striking resemblance to those of other terror 
organizations seeking sovereignty, such as the former Islamic State in Ash-Sham (ISIS), 
now the self-proclaimed IS.36 Comparable to IS’s dissatisfaction with the skewed 
allocation of resources between Shia and Sunni Muslims—which has propelled it to seek 
sovereignty in parts of Iraq and Syria—BH is attempting to recreate similar conditions in 
Nigeria, neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and the Niger Republic. BH consequently 
threatens more than just Nigeria. It has the potential to create regional instability. Even 
so, is BH’s defeat truly critical to U.S. interests in Africa, or is BH simply a nuisance?  
To examine this question in greater detail requires treating Boko Haram as a 
Sovereignty-Seeking Terror Organization (SSTO) as opposed to an Inclusion-Seeking 
Terror Organization (ITO). We define SSTOs as organizations that seek ethnic or 
theological primacy through the acquisition of sovereign territory. Specifically, an SSTO 
seeks to acquire territory, and in exchange for their support, populations within captured 
territories can expect the “sanctity of the social contract”37 to be upheld. Conversely, 
ITOs recognize a degree of ethnic, political or sectarian underrepresentation and seek to 
utilize a variety of means to gain wider political recognition, or societal inclusion in a 
pre-existing state. In sum, ITOs seek a degree of inclusion in the established government 
or state structure while SSTOs seek autonomy or separation, ranging from partial to full 
independence. Given this dynamic, we suggest that the BH insurgency, and that of IS, 
represent yet another form of sovereignty-seeking organization, which is not novel in its 
goals but rather in its approach to achieving autonomy. 
Hezbollah represents an organization that has adopted both approaches. The 
southern Lebanese separatist group grew into the de facto government and security 
apparatus in the under-governed regions of southern Lebanon following the vicious 
Lebanese Civil War during the 1980s, and wars against Israel though the 1990s and 
                                                 
36 Graeme Wood, “What ISIS’s Leader Really Wants: The Longer He Lives the More Powerful He 
Becomes,” New Republic, September 1, 2014, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119259/isis-history-
islamic-states-new-Caliphate-syria-and-iraq. 
37 Anna Simons, Duane Lauchengco, and Joe McGraw, The Sovereignty Solution: A Commonsense 
Approach to Global Security (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 43. 
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2000s.38 Later, Hezbollah transitioned to a recognized Lebanese political party.39 
Likewise, in the wake of the observed failures of “brutal dictatorships” in the Arab world, 
groups such as the Taliban progressed from violent revolt to providing a government 
structure to fill the void left after the defeat of apostate regimes.40 A more contemporary 
example of an exclusive SSTO is IS, which has to a large degree achieved territorial 
sovereignty in northern Iraq and Syria following a successful military campaign in the 
summer of 2014. The result has been IS’s capture of Raqqa in northern Syria, where IS 
governs by providing rudimentary services through administration by walis, who act 
essentially as governors or local administrators responsible to the larger organization.41  
We do not mean to suggest that BH has signaled its desire or the capability to 
provide social programs in Northern Nigeria, even though it has captured several towns 
and villages in northern Nigeria.42 Although the group physically controls the region and 
has rebuffed government efforts to recapture some villages, the group has failed to 
provide the level of social services that IS is delivering in captured portions of Iraq and 
Syria. BH has instead enacted a reign of brutal violence, public beheadings, mass 
murders, rape, and extortion akin to the level of coercive violence IS uses, but without its 
social programs.43  
Indeed, BH has effectively paralyzed the region and created a humanitarian 
disaster that has since spread to neighboring countries in the form of a flood of refugees. 
                                                 
38 Thanassis Cambanis, A Privilege to Die: Inside Hezbollah’s Legions and Their Endless War 
Against Israel (New York/London/Toronto/Sydney: Free Press, 2010), 9. 
39 Augustus Richard Norton, “The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Politics,” International Spectator: 
Italian Journal of International Affairs 42, no. 4 (2007): 480. 
40 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2001), 92–93, 212. 
41 Miriam Karouny, “In North West Syria, Islamic State Builds a Government,” Reuters News Agency 
Online, September 4, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/04/us-syria-crisis-raqqa-insight-
idUSKBN0GZ0D120140904. 
42 Tim Cooks, “Boko Haram ‘Leader’ Claims Baga Attacks in New Video,” Reuters News Agency 
Online, January 20, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/20/us-nigeria-bokoharam-
idUSKBN0KT2JO20150120. 
43 Julia Payne, “Nigerians Face Killings, Hunger, in Boko Haram’s State,” Reuters News Agency 
Online, January 19, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/20/us-nigeria-boko-haram-insight-
idUSKBN0KS1S120150120. 
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BH professes to aspire to a “Caliphate” similar to that which IS seeks, one which is 
reminiscent of the majestic Kanem-Borno empire of the late 1300s.44 However, the group 
has yet to achieve either the model set by IS in Iraq and Syria, much less that of 
Hezbollah. In our view, if BH adopts the IS approach to achieving a “Caliphate” in 
northern Nigeria, by continuing violent coercion and introducing social programs, the 
group will present a far greater threat to the GoN, to the broader region of West Africa, 
and to U.S. regional interests. However, for BH to reach IS’s current level would require 
it seizing resource-producing infrastructure, which is non-existent in Northern Nigeria, it 
would require sponsorship by others.  
At the moment, BH is still largely perceived as a local phenomenon, though as 
James Forest, former Director of Terrorism Studies at West Point, contends “BH’s 
emergence has strategic implications, which need to be addressed within its local context, 
along with the grievances that motivate its terrorist activity.”45 In other words, Forest 
implies that BH has the potential to undermine regional efforts if its grievances are 
ignored. 
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the degree to which the defeat of Boko 
Haram and its surrogates is strategic to U.S. interests in Nigeria and in neighboring states. 
To accomplish this requires examining relations between Nigeria and the United States 
over the past six decades to assess why Nigeria’s stability might be important to the 
United States. This thesis will also consider the importance of Nigeria to West Africa and 
to Africa more broadly, namely in its role as a regional hegemon, thanks to its economic 
and demographic dominance.  
To gauge Nigeria’s significance requires that we examine BH’s impact on 
Nigeria’s economic, ethnic, political, and military institutions, BH’s impact on regional 
stability, as well as BH’s potential to morph into a more dangerous organization. In our 
                                                 





view, BH does have the potential to rapidly evolve into a strategic threat akin to IS in Iraq 
and Syria. This thesis is not intended to cover in depth conditions that gave rise to BH, 
nor will it review BH’s history, as a multitude of works already cover both topics. 
Instead, this thesis is intended to advance the debate about BH as a potential radical threat 
to U.S. interests in Nigeria. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
To what degree might the persistence and expansion of BH threaten the strategic 
interests of the United States in Nigeria and its neighboring states? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
To better understand how the persistence and expansion of Boko Haram threatens 
U.S. critical interests, we will examine SSTOs. SSTOs are terror entities whose goals lie 
beyond simply accomplishing acts of terror, as they seek to carve out a new space for 
themselves rather than seek inclusion within an existing state. In this regard, we will use 
IS as a comparative case study. We will also review U.S. strategic interests broadly to 
gain a macro perspective, and then focus on U.S. strategic interests in Africa and Nigeria 
to ascertain whether Nigeria and Boko Haram actually affect U.S. strategic interests. 
What we want to know is: if so, in what capacity? And if not, why not?  
Furthermore, making the comparison with IS should also bring us back to our 
main question of whether the United States should be concerned about Nigeria in the face 
of other global competing requirements. Could U.S. efforts in Nigeria be limited to 
security concerns only? Or should they extend to political, economic, and social factors 
as well?  
As mentioned earlier, the United States maintains a limited footprint in Nigeria 
focused on assisting the Nigerian military rescue the captured schoolgirls in northern 
Nigeria. Is this operation strategic to U.S. interests in Nigeria? Or does it merely 
represent a political window-dressing exercise by the Obama administration in response 
to an international outcry? Last, in light of the Nigerian Presidential elections conducted 
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in March 2015, we will reflect on how the new government might neutralize BH’s effects 
in Nigeria and prevent them from having long-term strategically crippling effects. 
E. CHAPTER REVIEW  
In Chapter II, we will review existing U.S. economic and security interests in 
Nigeria and Africa to determine whether instability in Nigeria can indeed impact U.S. 
interests in the African region. Chapter III will examine BH’s effect on Nigeria’s 
economic, ethnic, political, and military infrastructure. Chapter IV presents our SSTO 
and ITO typology and describes how BH poses a threat to regional stability. Finally, we 
offer policy recommendations based on our overall findings and present options for 
addressing the BH problem in Chapter V. 
 13
II. U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN NIGERIA AND AFRICA 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Deciphering U.S. national interests in Nigeria and the broader African region 
requires an understanding of how the United States perceives its national security 
objectives and priorities. The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues 
provides relevant guidance on the definition of national interest. The manual defines 
national interests as “that which is deemed by a particular state (actor) to be a …desirable 
goal.”46 Presumably, these goals include political, economic, security, environmental, 
and moral well-being since these feed into “national power employed to implement a 
designated policy or strategy.”47 Because national interests drive policy and strategy, 
much care should be taken when defining them, which explains why Henry Kissinger 
somberly remarked, “when you are asking people to die, you have to be able to explain it 
in terms of the national security interest.”48  
Two common approaches to understanding national interests are realist and 
morality-based approaches. For realists, who perceive national security as the primary 
basis of a state’s national interest, power and security are the key terms that define what 
is in the state’s best interest.49 This is because realists consider disorder and confusion in 
the international system and the ensuing “threat of anarchy and constraints on sovereign 
states”50 to be an existential threat. As Hans Morgenthau describes it, the result of this 
realist perception creates a “need to focus an actor’s national interests on meeting its 
security requirements by protecting its ‘physical, political, and cultural identity against 
                                                 
46 Alan G. Stolberg, “Crafting National Interests in the 21st Century,” in U.S. Army War College 
Guide to National Security Issues, Volume II: National Security Policy and Strategy, ed. J. Boone 
Bartholomees, Jr. 5th ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 2012), 14. 
47 Ibid., 13–14. 
48 Henry Kissinger is quoted in Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and 
the Cuban Missile Crisis (Minneapolis, MN. University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 4. 
49 Stolberg, “Crafting National Interests in the 21st Century,” 17. 
50 Ibid. 
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encroachments by other nations.”51 By this measure, the realist constantly acts with 
solely his best interests in mind. 
In contrast, morality-based interests should benefit more than just the actor 
crafting the interest. Supporters of morality-based interests value human rights, freedom 
from economic deprivation, and freedom of disease and support humanitarian 
intervention as seen in actions undertaken in places, such as Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and 
Kosovo.52 Or, as Joseph Nye, subscriber to the morality-based school, puts it,  
National interests are a set of shared priorities that often include issues of 
human rights and democracy. A democratic definition of the national 
interest does not accept the difference between a morality-based and an 
interest [realism]-based foreign policy.53 
Peter Trubowitz offers another alternative for assessing national interests. By 
identifying America’s regional diversity as the most critical source of tension and conflict 
over foreign policy, he argues that the very definition of national interests is a product of 
politics.54 Trubowitz believes national interests should be “defined by those societal 
interests who have the power to work within the political system to translate their 
preferences into policy.”55 This assertion drives Trubowitz to conclude that national 
interests should more appropriately be defined in social terms due to the existing 
relationship between the social base and national interests. 56 
Tellingly, Allen Stolberg lists the United States’ four core national interests as: 
security of the homeland, economic well-being, promotion of democratic values, and the 
establishment of a secure world order. The first three interests have remained pseudo- 
constant over time, but the fourth is a consequence of the delayed realization that global 
stability requires the following: 
                                                 
51 Stolberg, “Crafting National Interests in the 21st Century,” 17. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Peter Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 4. 
55 Ibid., 5. 
56 Ibid. 
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The establishment of a peaceful international environment in which 
disputes between nations can be resolved without resort to war and in 
which collective security rather than unilateral action is employed to deter 
or cope with aggression.57 
Determining which resources should be dedicated to these core interests requires 
prioritizing their importance. This prioritization is key because often these core interests 
conflict with one another depending on the policymaker.58 In addition, by prioritizing 
which core interest to pursue, other issues, such as time available to attain the interest and 
the intrinsic value of the interest, may also come to light.59 After all, Sun Tzu, one of the 
greatest strategists of our time, constantly emphasized the notion that “it is never enough 
to know the enemy; you also have to know yourself.”60 Hence, by understanding the 
relationship between U.S. core interests and the resources they demand, a state’s goals 
become easier to achieve. 
Alternatively, interests can be typed according to whether they involve survival, 
vital, important or peripheral concerns, which Alan Stolberg refers to as intensities. Alan 
Stolberg defines survival interests as those interests associated with the very essence of 
the state’s existence, such as the protection of its citizens and institutions from imminent 
attack.61 For the purposes of this thesis, we will refer to survival interests as existential 
interests. Stolberg goes on to define vital interests as those interests that provide some 
room for compromise up to a certain point, beyond which compromise becomes 
intolerable because of its potential to harm the state. Important interests, on the other 
hand, are those that are significant but not crucial to the state’s well being, while 
peripheral interests do not involve either a threat to the state’s security or to the well 
being of its populace.62 Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between U.S. core interests 
and the intensity of those interests in greater detail.  
                                                 
57 Stolberg, “Crafting National Interests in the 21st Century,” 16.  
58 Ibid., 18. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Sun Tzu quoted by Simons, Lauchengco, and McGraw, The Sovereignty Solution: A Commonsense 
Approach to Global Security, 45. 
61 Stolberg, “Crafting National Interests in the 21st Century,” 18. 
62 Ibid. 
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Using the criterion of intensity to differentiate among existential, vital, important, 
and peripheral interests, the next section will begin to gauge where BH ranks in the 
priority of interests for the United States by first visiting the relationship between Nigeria 
and the United States. Our research has led us to conclude that the nature of the 
relationship between the United States and African countries depends primarily on public 









A SECURE WORLD 
ORDER 
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UNDERSTANDING U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS 
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INTERESTS 
INTENSITY OF  
INTERESTS 
Existential interests represent the most important interests of any state and are associated with the very essence of 
the state’s existence, such as the protection of its citizens and institutions from imminent attack. If not attained, it 
will result in catastrophic costs. EX. Prevent and deter the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks.  
Vital interests exist when an issue is so important to a state’s well-being that its leadership can compromise only up 
to a certain point. If the interest is achieved, it would bring great benefit to the actor; if denied, it would carry costs 
to the actor that are severe but not catastrophic. EX. Prevent WMD proliferation. 
Important Interests are significant but not crucial to the state’s well being. Damage to them could cause serious 
concern and harm to the actor’s overseas interests, but can be resolved with compromise and negotiation, rather 
than confrontation. EX. Promote, pluralism, freedom, democracy. 
Peripheral interests involve neither a threat to the actor’s security nor to the well being of its populace. Protection of 
such interests is desirable, but damage to them has little direct impact on state’s to safeguard its populace. EX. 
Preserving territorial integrity or a political constitution. 
 
Figure 2.  Understanding U.S. National Interests63 
B. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES AND NIGERIA’S 
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP  
The relationship between Nigeria and the United States has been a long and 
inconsistent one, and began prior to Nigeria’s independence in 1960.64 According to Levi 
                                                 
63 Stolberg, “Crafting National Interests in the 21st Century,” 18. 
64 Nwachuku, “The United States and Nigeria1960 to 1987: Anatomy of a Pragmatic Relationship,” 
575.  
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A. Nwachuku, by 1958, the United States had already provided assistance via Britain to 
10 GoN projects totaling $700,000, ergo demonstrating Washington’s interest in 
Nigeria’s economic development.65 After Nigeria’s independence, President Kennedy 
commissioned a special economic study to examine Nigeria’s 6-year development plan. 
Following the report’s recommendations, Kennedy increased his economic and military 
assistance to Nigerian to the tune of over $170 million between 1962 and 1966.66  
In May 1967, the southern region of NigeriaBiafraseceded and declared its 
independence from Nigeria, signaling the start of a four year-long civil war.67 As the 
United States evacuated its citizens from Enugu, the capital of Biafra, the Nigerian 
federal government began a blockade to prevent much needed resources from entering 
Biafra. In response, Europe and the United States sought to provide humanitarian relief to 
the 5–6 million residents hit by famine and disease. This event created an emotional 
support for Biafra so powerful in the United States that it prompted Senator Charles 
Goodell to visit Biafra and adopt a Biafran baby in a show of both compassion and 
political zeal.68  
William Haven North, who served as the Director for Central and West African 
Affairs for the Agency of International Development (USAID) from 1966 to 1970, 
described the period as producing “the most frantic and intense pressures one can 
experience.”69 North revealed the U.S.’s confused political stance at the time when, in an 
interview, he attempted to define the administration’s view of Nigeria: 
Initially under President Johnson the U.S. policy had been “one Nigeria.” 
We would not support any attempt to split up the country. Then Nixon 
became President in 1969 and the word “one Nigeria” was dropped. 
Because of the tremendous public support for Biafra, U. S. policy became 
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more ambivalent about Biafra’s secession and the principle of “one 
Nigeria” and the uncertainties about the outcome of the war. I believe that 
Nixon was somewhat partial to the Ibos [also known as Igbos] but largely 
wanted to do whatever was necessary “to get the issue off my back.”70 
Seeking a solution to the crisis, Henry Kissinger, then the National Security 
Advisor, urged the State Department to prepare a National Security Strategy 
Memorandum (NSSM) for the president and the Cabinet on what the future policy of the 
United States toward Nigeria should be. The NSSM eventually characterized the U.S. 
government’s primary interest and objectives for Nigeria/Biafra as humanitarian only.71 
However, oil interests further complicated U.S. concerns in Nigeria because the major oil 
producing regions lay within Biafra. As North further admits,  
The issue of supporting Biafra was also tied up with the question of oil 
interests; the major part of the oil reserves in Nigeria were in the Eastern 
Region with substantial American oil company investments. Were our 
interests in these oil resources better protected by supporting Biafran 
secession or the preservation of Nigeria as one country?72 
Ultimately, the United States assumed a position of neutrality during the conflict, 
and denied a request for arms from the GoN to combat the Biafrans. The U.S. neutrality 
policy angered the GoN, and the United States did little to mollify it even as the United 
States committed $9 million for relief efforts in southern Nigeria after Biafra’s 
surrender.73 The lack of full participation by the United States in the Nigerian civil war 
suggests that, from the perspective of national security interests, the United States 
considered the conflict in Nigeria to be important enough to merit playing a supporting 
role, but not vital enough to threaten its core interests. 
After the civil war, the Nigerian government remained at odds with the United 
States over its unsanctioned humanitarian support to Biafra. President Nixon, in an 
attempt to ease tensions between both countries, sent a congratulatory note to General 
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Yakubu Gowon, the Nigerian military leader, in which he praised the general for not 
being vindictive toward the defeated Biafrans.74 Nixon’s Secretary of State, William 
Rogers, also visited Nigeria in 1970, evidently “to demonstrate to the Nigerian 
government American satisfaction over the outcome of the war.”75 However, when 
General Gowon visited the United States for five days in 1973 as the Nigerian head of 
State, President Nixon refused to meet with him, causing further damage to an already 
strained relationship.76  
President Jimmy Carter later visited Nigeria in 1977 in order to help repair the 
rocky relationship. As a result, throughout his administration, Nigeria’s relationship with 
the United States continued to improve, especially since Nigeria began supplying over 
15% of the oil consumed in the United States by the late 1970s.77 The two countries also 
sustained amicable trade relations through the 1980s and 1990s, a fact highlighted by the 
United States forgiving $80.5 million in Nigerian debt in 1989.78 However, by 2000, 
corruption, political developments, and militant violence in the Niger-Delta resulted in 
more than a 25% drop in production and export levels of oil,79 driving Nigeria from 
being America’s 5th largest foreign oil supplier in 2011 to 8th by August 2013.80 Still, 
the United States and Nigeria have remained allies despite these missteps.  
These persistent efforts to extend the olive branch to Nigeria begs the question: 
why did the United States so strongly seek friendly relations with Nigeria? Levi 
Nwachuku argues that, although Nigeria attracted U.S. interest because of a shared 
colonial master in Britain, the United States was more intoxicated by “the prospect that 
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Nigeria would assume a leadership role in the African continent.”81 The United States 
viewed Nigeria as “the one nation whose support was most critical for a U.S. relationship 
with black people everywhere,”82 necessitating a continued investment to promote 
economic and political stability in Nigeria. 
In his assessment of the U.S.-Nigeria relationship, Robert Shepard contends that 
the nature of the relationship depended on who sat in the Oval Office. Shepard takes the 
position that, depending who was in the White House, Washington maintained two views 
of Nigeria. One view, adopted by President Reagan and most Republicans, focused on the 
primary goal of curtailing Soviet influence, with a secondary focus on “narrow economic 
interests.”83 In contrast, Democrats like Presidents Kennedy and Carter believed that U.S. 
policy in Africa should be expanded from “narrow strategic and economic matters” to 
larger issues, such as eradicating “hunger, poverty, civil war, racism, and human 
rights.”84 In Shepard’s view, relations between the United States and Nigeria would have 
been healthier if only the United States paid constant attention to Nigeria, as opposed to 
only when the media and world opinion required it to do so.85  
In the BH era, the media once again forced Washington into action in response to 
the kidnapping of the nearly 300 girls referenced in the previous chapter. Prior to the 
hostage incident, BH had captured or killed thousands of Nigerians and foreign nationals 
while inciting a refugee crisis. Yet, Washington paid these crimes minimal attention.86 
Not until the public reacted thanks to a powerful social media campaign to free the girls, 
did Washington jump into action and provide military support to the GoN.87 This 
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common pattern of only participating in conflicts at the urging of the American public 
has caused many Africans beyond just Nigerians to question Washington’s commitment, 
and to speculate that Western interests are more often driven by an affinity for oil and 
other natural resources than people’s plight. Similarly, this unsystematic response by 
Washington to the crisis in Nigeria reflects an unclear foreign policy to combat BH, a 
lapse which has been identified and exploited by mass media. 
This news cycle approach to foreign policy, better known as the “CNN effect,” is 
not new. In fact, the media has long maintained the capability to drive government action, 
thus “encapsulating the idea that real-time communications technology could provoke 
major responses from domestic audiences and political elites to global events.”88 As a 
result, media influence is frequently blamed for the U.S.’s involvement in Operation 
Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992, and recent operations to combat Joseph Kony and the 
Lords Resistance Army in Central Africa. Taking not only syndicated media's impact but 
also the power of social media advocacy into account, it is quite easy to see how 
Washington can be maneuvered into taking action in Nigeria. 
C. U.S. STRATEGIC SECURITY INTERESTS IN AFRICA 
To better understand U.S. security interests in Africa, we examined historic and 
current national strategic documents, particularly those focused on the role of the U.S. 
military in the pursuit of U.S. strategic interests in Africa. For instance, Lauren Ploch, a 
Congressional Research Service analyst on African affairs, sheds some interesting light 
on the 2007 formation of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in her 2011 report. 
Ploch argues that AFRICOM came into being due to “violent extremist activities and 
other potential threats posed by under-governed spaces, such as maritime piracy and 
illicit trafficking.”89  
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In addition, these illicit enterprises sought to gain control over Africa’s vast 
natural resources; their success would be highly detrimental to African progress.90 
According to Ploch, AFRICOM sought to promote “U.S. strategic objectives and protect 
U.S. interests in the region by working with African states and regional organizations to 
help strengthen their defense capabilities … to contribute to regional stability and 
security.”91 As a result, AFRICOM’s mission differed from that of the other existing 
combatant commands in that its mission encompassed broader objectives, which included 
a “soft power” mandate for building a stable security environment.92 In essence, with the 
formation of AFRICOM, the United States underpinned the importance of partnering 
with African nations to pursue long lasting development initiatives and strengthen local 
security in the face of such radical elements as AQ in Africa. 
Consequently, by 2011, the U.S. National Military Strategy designated AQIM in 
Mali, and Al-Shabaab in East Africa as threats to the United States. Emphasis on these 
terrorist organizations signified recognition of the need to thwart African terrorist 
organizations from remotely planning, coordinating, and extending their operational 
reach.93 Subsequently, the 2012 Department of Defense Strategic Guidance also 
mentioned the increased threat to U.S. interests in Africa and, specifically, the need to 
“develop innovative, low cost, and small footprint approaches to achieve our security 
objectives…”94 Both the 2011 and 2012 strategic guidance directives reveal an awareness 
on the part of U.S. security decision makers that Africa was becoming a battle ground in 
the War on Terror.  
As for BH specifically, the U.S. Congress released a report entitled “Boko Haram: 
Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland” in November 2011. This report highlighted the 
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risks Boko Haram presented to U.S. interests in Africa at the time and concluded that 
Boko Haram posed an emerging threat to U.S. interests and the U.S. homeland.95 The 
report further indicates “Boko Haram has the intent and may be developing the capability 
to coordinate on a rhetorical and operational level with AQIM and Al-Shabaab.”96 Not 
surprisingly, the report recommended that Washington work with the GoN to build 
counterterrorism and intelligence capabilities to effectively counter Boko Haram.97 
However, the State Department did not share Congress’ view, as evidenced in its 
delay before designating BH a foreign terror organization (FTO), which is the clearest 
indicator that a group poses a threat to U.S. national interests. 98 It was not until January 
2013 that the 113th U.S. Congress finally passed a bill requiring the State Department to 
designate BH as an FTO.99 This was in part thanks to the chairman of the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Rep. Patrick Meehan, who believed 
that the FTO designation would “curb [BH’s] financing, stigmatize and isolate it 
internationally, heighten public awareness and knowledge, and signal to other 
governments the U.S. takes the threat from Boko Haram seriously.”100 His assertion 
finally led the State Department to successfully designate BH as an FTO in November 
2013.101  
The FTO designation, although late by many standards, represents what is now 
the consensus view that BH poses a threat: But to whom? The absence of an intensity 
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specification as to the level of threat BH poses, specifically when it comes to the issue of 
whether BH’s defeat should be considered of existential, vital, important, or peripheral 
interest to the United States remains open for debate. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR) attempted to answer this question, but fell short. The QDR, however, did 
envisage an increase in the current threat to the homeland from Africa, and the need to 
improve the U.S.’s ability to effectively target threats as they evolve, even under 
significant fiscal constraints.102  
Likewise, the 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) also failed to stress how 
seriously to consider the severity of BH’s actions in relation to U.S. interests in the 
region. Although the NSS emphasized the need for the United States to strengthen the 
organizational capacity of the African Union (AU) and increase its ability to rapidly 
deploy to emerging crises, it glosses over the implications of the declining security 
challenges surrounding BH.103 This omission perhaps indicates that BH poses a less 
severe threat than other AQ affiliates operating in North and East Africa. Is that the case, 
however, when one looks at the degree to which BH impacts U.S. economic interests in 
West Africa? 
D. U.S. ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN AFRICA AND NIGERIA  
Africa, the world’s second largest continent, is filled with enormous quantities of 
natural resources ranging from oil to cobalt. Africa contains vital metals and minerals that 
are exported to all parts of the world, such as uranium, used in nuclear energy production; 
platinum, used in jewelry and industrial applications; nickel, used in stainless steel, 
magnets, coins, and rechargeable batteries; bauxite, a main aluminum ore; and cobalt, 
used in color pigments.104 The two most consistently profitable mineral resources found 
in Africa are gold and diamonds. In 2014, South Africa and Ghana were among the top 
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10 gold producers in the world.105 Similarly, Botswana, Angola, South Africa, and other 
African countries were the source of 50% of the world’s diamonds in 2014.106 
When it comes to oil, countries, such as Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, and 
Angola dominate Africa’s oil industry. According to a 2012 estimate by British 
Petroleum (BP) and the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Africa will be 
the world’s fourth most important region for oil and gas production by 2035.107 This 
prediction is especially relevant considering that Nigeria was the 8th largest exporter of 
oil to the United States in 2013. Yet, as indicated in Table 1, oil imported from Nigeria 
and other African regions is down significantly since 2003, indicating a declining 
dependence by the United States on African petroleum products. As confirmation, in 
2014, the United States imported over 70,000 fewer total barrels of oil from Nigeria 
compared to 2013 (a 33% reduction), and there are no indications this trend will change 
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Table 1.   Where the United States Got Its Oil in 2013109 
 
 
The reasons for the decline in oil imports to the United States are many. Among 
them is the uncertainty borne of conflict in the region and characterized by the unequal 
distribution of wealth. Attacks on oil infrastructure by militant groups in Nigeria have led 
to reductions in production and local income.110 In addition, methods of extracting 
resources like oil have had negative long lasting environmental impacts. For instance, the 
use of out-of-date equipment for drilling in Nigeria has severely polluted air, soil, and 
water resources leading to losses in arable land and fish stocks.111 Lacks of oversight 
from the government coupled with pervasive corruption have caused ethnic minorities to 
conclude that “foreign oil companies have exploited their labor while keeping most of the 
wealth.”112 This sentiment is not restricted to Nigeria, but resonates more broadly there. 
To combat this perception both in Nigeria and in Africa, the United States has 
ramped up its rhetoric about China’s influence. China has acquired a reputation over the 
years as a voracious consumer of African natural resources while serving as one of the 
most dominant trading partners for corrupt regimes, but doing little to help alleviate 
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poverty, or improve local well-being.113 At the same time, the United States has tried 
improving its trade relations with African countries. In August 2014, the United States 
hosted a historic three-day long U.S.-African summit in Washington, DC, where leaders 
from over 50 African countries gathered to discuss ways to bolster trade opportunities 
and improve economic ties between Africa and the United States. During the summit, 
President Obama expressed his commitment to Africa by promising to “build genuine 
partnerships that create jobs and opportunity for all our people and that unleash the next 
era of African growth.”114  
Other trade initiatives, such as the African Growth and Opportunities Act 
(AGOA) and Trade Africa, have improved trade relations between the United States and 
African countries. AGOA offers tangible incentives to encourage countries to continue to 
open their economies and build free markets,115 while Trade Africa incentivizes trade 
within Africa and expands economic ties between Africa, the United States, and other 
global markets.116 Other smaller initiatives at work similarly stress the importance of 
Africa to the United States. Nevertheless, the question remains about how greatly the 
U.S. values its economic ties to African countries. For instance, if Africa’s economies 
matter to the United States, should not domestic terrorism in Africa’s most populous 
country and the U.S.’s largest trading partner in the region, namely Nigeria, matter more? 
Generally, the United States relies on countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as 
consumers for its manufactured goods. In 2014, the total trade between the United States 
and SSA totaled $48 billion, with exported goods to SSA countries accounting for more 
than half the total at $23.56 billion.117 Despite what sound like impressive numbers, U.S. 
imports from SSA countries accounted for only 1.7% of total goods imported into the 
United States in 2013. The small overall number is considered by some to indicate just 
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how little the United States depends on African goods, with the exception of petroleum 
products. These figures are illustrated more clearly in Table 2.  
Table 2.   U.S. Trade in Goods with Sub-Saharan Africa ($ Billions)118 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014
IMPORTS 23.49 21.29 17.89 25.63 35.88 50.36 59.09 67.36 86.05 46.9 65.03 49.62 39.29 24.43
EXPORTS 5.93 6.94 6.03 6.87 8.34 10.21 11.86 14.3 18.47 15.16 17.11 22.5 23.94 23.56
TOTAL 29.42 28.23 23.92 32.5 44.22 60.58 70.95 81.65 105.42 62.06 82.14 72.13 63.23 47.99
U.S. TRADE IN GOODS WITH SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
 
 
Of course, one reason African nations may not produce more could be protracted 
internal conflicts combined with endemic corruption, disease, poverty, and other factors 
that sap people’s energy, optimism, and willingness to invest at home. This could help 
explain these numbers, but so too, could be the rise of terrorism.  
For instance, consider Boko-Haram-affected regions in Chad, Niger, and 
Cameroon. The United States relies on these four nations to produce the goods listed in 
Table 3, with two products—oil and cocoa—being especially important. As exports from 
the region decreased markedly, by contrast goods imported from the United States 
increased between 2012–2013 (see Table 4). The data from Table 4 suggest that the 
decrease in exports might be related to BH’s activities. We will explore these activities 
further in the next section. 
Table 3.   Top Imported Goods from BH Affected Regions in 
2013(Dollars)119 
NIGERIA NIGER CHAD CAMEROUN 
Goods Amount Goods Amount Goods Amount Goods Amount 
Oil and Petroleum  11.6B Special Provisions  783K Oil 2.4B Oil 270M 
Cocoa 29M Electric Machinery 478K Resins 12M Wood  33M 
Special items 21M Art 274K     Rubber 25M 
Food Waste  9M         Cocoa 22M 
Art/Antiquities  5M             
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Table 4.   Total Trade between U.S. and BH Afflicted Countries in Dollars 
(2012–2013)120 
  
 NIGERIA NIGER CHAD CAMEROON 
Year 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 
Import $19B $11.7B $4.5M $2.3M $2.8B 2.6B $426M $367M 
Export $5.1B $6.5B $35.5M $46M $36.50 $41M $253M $331M 
 
E. BH’S EFFECTS ON THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY AND ITS NEIGHBORS 
Since BH rose to prominence in 2009, many have speculated on its potential 
effects on foreign direct investments (FDI).121 Through acts of indiscriminate violence 
and crafty messaging via YouTube and Twitter, BH has scared Western businesses away 
from northern Nigeria. As evidence, the World Investment Report (WIR) indicated a 
2.1% drop in FDI in Nigeria, from $8.9 billion in 2011 to $7 billion in 2012, a net loss of 
$1.9 billion.122 This decline is significant because FDIs have a direct impact on trade, and 
are an indicator of economic health, and thus can be considered integral to the Nigerian 
domestic economy and to the country’s economic development.  
This is why BH’s indiscriminate killing of civilians is so concerning. The 
massacres have caused a mass exodus of citizens from northern Nigeria to calmer areas. 
This outflow has reduced the number of skilled laborers in the north. This migration has 
also led to declines in agricultural production, causing food prices to skyrocket, rising 
9.8% in June 2014 alone. The inflation rate has also risen to 8.2%, the highest in almost a 
year.123 Additionally, the exodus has forced businesses and institutions that normally 
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cater to large populations to close or relocate due to a significant decrease in economic 
activity.124  
Ripple effects from the impact of BH’s attacks on churches, banks, and 
commercial agencies have likewise been felt in neighboring countries, such as Chad, 
Cameroon, and Niger. Traders from these regions who usually travel to northern Nigeria 
to trade iron and steel in Kano are afraid to visit because of the declining regional 
security.125 Tourism in the north has also dried up as a result of BH’s actions. This once-
booming industry, a key source of economic capital in the north that usually generated 
$400m (N80b) annually, is now at a standstill.126  
Beyond the impact on the economy, refugees fleeing Nigeria are also creating a 
humanitarian crisis. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
conservatively estimates that upward of 135,000 Nigerians fled into Cameroon, Chad, 
and Niger.127 Other assessments place refugees fleeing to Cameroon and Niger alone at 
160,000.128 Considering that Niger and Chad are poor countries on the bottom rung of 
the U.N. Human Development Index, and given that Cameroon is already harboring 
200,000 refugees who fled the unrest in the Central African Republic,129 the likelihood of 
the refugee crisis further straining these countries and potentially having destabilizing 
effects, is extremely high.  
For instance, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian affairs 
(OCHA) estimates that 54% of households in Northern Cameroon are facing food 
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shortages and are at risk of famine, and 70% of farmers have deserted their farms or 
missed out on timely planting because of the threat of BH.130 The hunger crisis is 
expected to worsen with the temporary settlements for the refugees becoming permanent 
and inhospitable, all of which only provides BH with “a convenient source of prey, 
recruits, and succor.”131 At the time of this writing, the attacks in Cameroon and Chad 
are intensifying thanks to these interlinked vicious cycles created by BH.  
Not everyone agrees, however, that the economic situation is dire. Some 
observers like Dr. Usman Muttaka, a professor in the Department of Economics of the 
Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, argue that BH’s effects on the Nigerian economy have 
been minimal. Muttaka roots his argument in his faith in a resilient Nigerian economy.132 
He argues that there is no economic crisis in Nigeria, and investors are free to conduct 
business in Nigeria so long as they stay away from the north, where BH is most active.133  
Angus Gillespie also supports Muttaka’s argument by citing updated statistics on 
FDIs, which indicate a resurgence of foreign interest in the Nigerian economy despite 
recent BH escalations. Gillespie reports, “more than $21B of FDI poured into Nigeria in 
2013, a 28% increase from 2012,” though he then concedes, “…but all of that could be 
quickly eroded if the violence is not snuffed out.”134 Meanwhile, if these critics are 
correct and Nigeria is safe for business so long as the conflict zones are avoided, then 
economic and other disparities between the north and other parts of the country will only 
widen and deepen. That would only play further into BH’s hands.  
F. SUMMARY 
The United States and Nigeria share a long historical relationship, albeit a non-
committal one. Although the United States has come to Nigeria’s aid in its times of need, 
U.S. involvement in Nigerian affairs often only occurred in response to a public outcry. 
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The relationship has ebbed and flowed based on the incumbent administration’s 
perspective on the importance of Africa. Post-9/11, and with the emergence of Islamic 
extremism in Africa, the need for regional stability in less governed spaces and fragile 
states has piqued the U.S.’s interest in increased security in Africa. With the 
establishment of AFRICOM, the United States has communicated its intent to play a 
larger role in assisting African countries attain stability.  
Economically driven initiatives, such as the African Growth and Opportunities 
Act and Trade Africa, have likewise led to expanded trade within Africa, and 
strengthened economic ties between Africa, the United States, and other global markets. 
But although economic relations between some African countries and the United States 
have improved over time, the figures indicate that the amount of goods imported from 
SSA countries in 2013 amounted to only 1.7% of total goods coming into the United 
States. This discouraging figure hence tracks what is often only a passing interest in 
Africa. 
Meanwhile, BH continues to impact the Nigerian economy and those of Nigeria’s 
neighbors in profound ways. BH’s actions have caused an exodus from northern Nigeria 
and exacerbated an already fragile refugee problem in Cameroon. With inaction, the 
situation is sure to worsen, creating space for BH to achieve its goal of establishing an IS 
on Nigerian soil. If that were to happen, would further instability threaten U.S. interests 
in the region? And if so, in what capacity? Should the threat posed by BH be perceived as 
existential, vital, important, or peripheral?  
The next chapter attempts to shed light on these questions by illustrating how BH, 
through its actions and messaging, is on course to destabilize Nigeria’s ethnic, political, 
and military institutions.  
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III. BOKO HARAM’S EFFECTS AND MESSAGING ON NIGERIA 
AND AFRICA 
Since the end of the civil war no calamity of enormous proportion has 
befallen [Nigeria] more than the horror unleashed by the dreadful Boko 
Haram sect.…on a daily basis there is panic. The fear of the invisible 
agitators has become the beginning of wisdom135 
—Emmanuel Oladesu,  
The Nation Newspaper, 2013 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Determining whether BH poses a threat to U.S. national interests also requires 
that we better understand BH’s effects on Nigeria and its neighbors. Following the death 
of its former leader, Mohammed Yusuf, at the hands of the Nigerian police, BH has 
employed a crafty messaging strategy to target the Nigerian military for revenge. BH’s 
primary tool in this regard has been to recruit disenfranchised youth, destitute children, 
and unemployed high school and university graduates willing to do its bidding. The ease 
with which BH has recruited a large number of youth begs the question, what is the 
impetus for so many Nigerian youth to join BH?  
A study commissioned by the U.S. Institute of Peace cites ignorance of religious 
teachings as the top reason for youth radicalization and recruitment into armed groups.136 
To be more precise, the lack of a deep understanding of the Quran by young Muslims 
allows charlatan Islamic scholars to propagate Qutbist ideology in support of BH’s quest 
to form a revolutionary vanguard (jama’a), capable of challenging the status quo 
(jahiliyyah).  
To reinforce its recruitment strategy, BH has adopted a messaging campaign that 
advertises its operational links with Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other organizations. For 
example, in 2003, BH capitalized on Osama Bin Laden’s comments that singled out 
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Nigeria as one of the countries requiring liberation from infidels,137 and in 2010, also 
leveraged AQIM Emir Abdelmalek Droukel’s statement of solidarity with BH in 
Nigeria.138 By doing so, BH propagated an image many argue is actually larger than its 
true capacity.  
However, the actual relationship between AQ and BH is more rhetorical than 
real,139 and has failed to reach its full potential for several reasons. For one, BH’s focus is 
on a domestic conflict in Nigeria, which runs counter to AQ’s global jihad aims. Second, 
BH’s leader, Abubakr Shekau, is thought to be “too unstable, impetuous, and unreliable 
to attract professional terrorists.”140 In fact, though, Shekau’s quixotic reputation has 
actually proven to be a blessing in disguise for BH since IS found him worthy enough to 
invite BH to join its growing list of affiliates.141 Of course, one reason ISIS has been 
drawn to Shekau and BH is their impact on Nigeria’s ethnic, political, and military 
infrastructure.  
B. UNDERSTANDING THE NIGERIAN ETHNIC LANDSCAPE 
With a population of over 150 million, Nigeria is by far the most populous 
country in Africa, boasting over 250 distinct ethnic groups speaking more than 500 
languages and dialects.142 The major ethnic groups locations are shown in Figure 3. The 
two largest tribesHausa and Fulaniwho reside in northern Nigeria, are predominantly 
Muslim, and comprise 29% of the population.143 The Kanuri, another Muslim tribe in the 
north, make up another 4% of the population. The large southern tribes include the 
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Yoruba (21%), Igbo (18%), Ijaw (10%), Ibibio (4%), and Tiv (2%), and are largely 
Christian.144 
 
Figure 3.  Map of the Major Ethnic and Linguistic Groups in Nigeria145 
Muslims make up about 50% of the population in Nigeria and mostly reside in the 
north, while Christians, about 40%, reside in the south. The final 10% of the population, 
which practices traditional, animistic religions, also resides in the south.146 The divide 
between mostly Sunni Muslims in the north and Christians in the south is prominent and 
dominates the national competition for political power.147 One especially sees this in the 
middle belt of Nigeria, which is beset by inter-ethnic tensions and sectarian conflicts.  
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However, even in the Muslim north, there are tensions, particularly between the 
Kanuri and Hausa-Fulani. The Kanuri converted to Islam centuries before their Hausa-
Fulani counterparts and hence “view themselves as the rightful standard-bearers of Islam 
in Nigeria.”148 The Kanuri northeast, once part of the former Kanem-Borno empire, is 
ruled by the Shehu of Borno. This region has largely remained outside the influence of 
the Hausa-Fulani Sultan of Sokoto, the dominant ruler in the northwest.149 Lately, the 
Kanuri have been marginalized both politically and economically and accuse local 
Hausa-Fulani leaders of corruption and collusion with the Christian government.150 This 
narrative has been very useful for BH’s recruitment of Kanuri. 
C. BH’S EFFECT ON THE NIGERIAN ETHNIC LANDSCAPE 
People in northern Nigeria are familiar with the Caliphate that existed there in the 
early 1800s. Indeed, most Nigerian Muslims are quite aware of the Sokoto Caliphate 
established by Osman dan Fodio during the early 1800s.151 Dan Fodio’s Caliphate 
elevated the north and established sharia law and Islamic schools to supplant Western-
based educational systems.152  
Because BH is indigenous to Borno State, which bears the footprint of the 
celebrated Kanem-Borno empire, BH has also invoked the Kanem-Borno empire to rally 
support for its cause. The Kanem-Borno empire (1380–1870) as seen in Figure 4, thrived 
as an Islamic state during the 1400s, “conquered other kingdoms, controlled sub-Saharan 
trade routes and entered into diplomatic relations with kings from Cairo to Turkey.”153 
The empire was so respected and illustrious that it drew numerous Islamic scholars from 
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Sudan and North Africa to the burgeoning capital city of Birnin Gazargamo, situated 
about 150km west of Lake Chad in Yobe State, Nigeria.154  
 
Figure 4.  Map of the Kanem-Borno Empire (1380AD–1870AD)155 
In its recruitment pitches, BH leaders frequently allude to the historical 
significance and dominance of the powerful Islamic Kanem-Borno empire and preach 
passionately about reclaiming its lost lands, which stretched through Chad, eastern Niger, 
northern Cameroon, and northeastern Nigeria. In fact, Mohammed Yusuf, inspired by the 
writings of medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyya,156 claimed, “our land was an Islamic state 
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before it was turned into a land of Kafir (infidels)…the current system is contrary to true 
Muslim beliefs.”157  
During the mid-2000s, Yusuf further blended his “Caliphate” narrative, with that 
of Saudi Salifist cleric Bakr Din Abdullah Abu Zayd, whose writings profess a rejection 
of Western education. Yusuf used this narrative to appeal to a wider band of curious and 
disillusioned Muslim youth in northern Nigeria.158  
Abubakr Shekau has followed Yusuf’s lead, and has also promoted the Caliphate 
concept as a means to establish a more functional Nigeria, free from the failings of the 
apostate Western-oriented government. In doing so, Shekau has tried capitalizing on the 
north vs. south and Muslim vs. Christian divide as a means to solidify sharia law and 
religious reforms in the North. However, using religious reforms as a wedge issue has not 
upset most southerners as long as BH’s actions remain confined to the north. Moreover, 
because most of the oil productionthe major source of wealth in Nigeriais in the 
south, most southerners do not feel particularly threatened by BH’s ability to undermine 
Nigeria’s economy.  
However, southerners may be making a mistake, since the problems are not quite 
as simple as Muslin north vs. Christian south. As journalist Andrew Walker notes:  
When viewed from outside, it can appear that these conflicts boil down to 
religious differences, tensions between blocs of Muslim and Christian 
inhabitants. When one looks deeper, however, one finds that politics—
more precisely, control of government patronage—is the primary cause of 
many of these conflicts… When violence erupts in these circumstances, 
the genesis is usually in one group asserting control of the apparatus of 
government over another group or groups in a very heterogeneous and 
ethnically diverse part of Nigeria.159 
Walker’s point is that it is myopic to simply focus on ethnic and regional or 
religious differences, because the overall political landscape also matters. 
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D. UNDERSTANDING THE NIGERIAN POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 
Since it achieved independence in 1960, military juntas ruled Nigeria until 1998. 
In 1998, elites of the popular People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressive 
Congress (APC) arranged to alternate the presidency between the primarily Muslim north 
and the largely Christian south.160 In 2011, after serving almost a year as president 
following the expected death of ailing President Umaru Yar’Adua, southern Christian 
President Goodluck Jonathan unexpectedly rose to the top of the political system. 
Regarding the prior arrangement, President Jonathan campaigned and won election over a 
northern candidate, albeit with the support of some members of the northern Islamic 
establishment, whom he allegedly bribed.161 Former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, John 
Campbell, quite critical of President Jonathan, has argued:  
Jonathan’s failure to replace the system of alternate Christian and Muslim 
presidents with a new balancing structure during a period of accelerating 
political appeals to ethnic and religious identities has been an important 
driver of northern [marginalization] and a catalyst for the current wave of 
conflicts there.162  
Essentially, what Campbell suggests is that dissolution of the previous 
arrangement created a vacuum for Boko Haram.163 Indeed, as newly elected Nigerian 
President Goodluck Jonathan took the oath of office in May 2011, BH detonated three 
bombs at an army barracks in Bauchi state, killing at least 14 people.164  
Although most Nigerians accepted the election results as fair, public opinion polls 
revealed that most voters also felt the “government is not on the side of the people; and 
that their poverty is a result of government neglect, pervasive corruption, and abuse.”165 
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Indeed, under Jonathan’s reign, Nigerian politics catered primarily to the elites.166 
Nigeria’s oil wealth came to increasingly reside in “the hands of a small group of wealthy 
Nigerians,”167 making its “income distribution among the most unequal in the world.”168 
This left millions of Nigerians wallowing in poverty; lacking food, shelter, primary health 
care, education, roads, basic utilities, and sustained employment.169 This is perhaps best 
captured by the high unemployment rate, which was 37% in 2013 compared to 21% in 
2010.170  
Beyond its neglect of large segments of society, Jonathan’s administration is also 
often accused of enabling BH’s rise. Jonathan’s critics alleged that Jonathan himself 
abetted the group to make Northern Nigeria so ungovernable as to prevent the 2015 
elections and remain in power.171 This assessment is based on the view that Nigeria’s 
military is more than capable of defeating BH if it truly wanted to, and the perception that 
President Jonathan required instability instigated by BH to ensure his political 
survival.172 Regardless of whether the accusations are accurate, BH did seize the 
initiative and launched its own offensive against Nigeria’s political establishment.  
E. BOKO HARAM’S EFFECT ON THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 
In 2012, the World Bank released a report on governance indicators and ranked 
Nigeria in the 10.4th percentile on the rule of law, in the 15.8th percentile in government 
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effectiveness, and in the 11th percentile for corruption.173 Even in terms of health care, 
Nigeria ranks at the bottom. According to the United Nations, Nigeria ranked 187th out 
of 191 nations in healthcare in 2010.174 Such statistics reflect abysmal lapses in how the 
country is managed, particularly when it has so much economic potential. Tellingly, in 
2013, President Goodluck Jonathan fired the head of the Nigerian Central Bank for 
failing to account for $20 billion in oil revenue missing from the Treasury,175 signaling 
his intent to fight corruption. However, in a sad irony, the message this transmitted to the 
Nigerian public was that “politicians and the[ir] supporters have been helping themselves 
to the country’s oil largess.”176  
Meanwhile, in northern Nigeria, the poverty rate is nearly double that of the rest 
of the country, and one in four children is severely malnourished. In addition, the child 
mortality rate in the north is alarming; for every 100 babies born, 20 are expected to 
die.177 The 33% literacy rate in the north also cannot be overlooked, as it directly reflects 
the lack of schools and feeds a youth unemployment rate of 41%, which is among the 
highest in the world.178 Particularly in Borno State, the birthplace of BH, the illiteracy 
rate is an alarming 83% among youth, and 48.5% of children do not attend school.179  
As these glaring statistics indicate, extremists have a vast pool from which to 
recruit, and they consequently have little trouble tapping into armed gangs, such as the 
Almajirai (street children) to do their bidding.180 BH favors the Almajirai because 
traditionally, it is customary in Nigerian Islamic communities for the Almajirai to be 
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beholden to those who provide them with basic necessities.181 Thus, such groups can be 
put to use by whoever provides them with basic necessities, such as food, clothes, and 
shelter. This act in itself is an adroit attempt by BH to establish a new social contract 
while undermining the underpinnings of the existing social contract between the populace 
and the state. 
BH also publishes sermons and records condemning the corrupt attitudes of the 
yan boko, elites who have power thanks to their Western education. BH discredits the 
current un-Islamic and corrupt system represented by the yan boko, who are deemed to be 
“unjust, secular, and [without] divine origin.”182 This narrative resonates with the 
Almajirai, as well as the “impoverished, alienated and jobless northern Muslim 
youth,”183 causing significant concerns within the Nigerian military. 
F. UNDERSTANDING THE NIGERIAN MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE 
Prior to the establishment of the Nigerian Army, local towns possessed loose 
military organizations consisting of able-bodied men who were called upon in time of 
crisis to defend the town. At the culmination of the crisis, the men usually returned to 
their homes and resumed their everyday life.184 However, as the British gained control 
over Nigeria in the early 1860s,185 they established a professional military, which no 
longer owed its allegiance to towns and villages, but rather to the state. This newly 
formed standing Army was paid, trained, and maintained to fight wars on behalf of the 
colonial government, and did so until the eve of Nigerian independence in 1960.186 
In preparation for independence, the incoming civilian GoN began to make 
adjustments to existing policies within the military, especially since colonial practice had 
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been to draw most of the infantry from the North and technical units from the South.187 
The new GoN instituted recruitment quotas of 50% from the North, and 25% each from 
the West and East.188 The GoN also applied similar quotas to officer recruitment. The 
GoN intended the army to be above politics and focused the army’s role on protecting the 
country from external attacks, assisting in internal security issues, and undertaking relief 
and welfare duties in the event of natural disasters.189 These changes proved successful in 
establishing a more ethnically balanced and professional force. In fact, the army 
performed so well in resolving several domestic skirmishes and inspired such high 
confidence among Nigerians, that the civilian leadership asked it to supervise the 1964 
presidential elections.190 
As a consequence of being perceived to be above politics, Nigeria’s first military 
Junta, which toppled the elected civilian regime in 1966, took the country by surprise and 
changed the country’s trajectory. As S. C. Ukpabi puts it, “by that single act, the Nigerian 
military changed its role from being the willing tool of the civilian government to 
becoming rulers of the country.”191 Yet, as surprising as the coup was, Nigerians 
welcomed the “rigid discipline, austere nature, ability to get things done, devotion to duty 
and less corrupt attitude in public matters” associated with the military. This perception 
allowed the military to begin to dominate all aspects of Nigerian politics, to include 
military members and uniformed personnel serving as State governors, ambassadors, and 
even heads of corporations.192  
Yet, the inability of the military to mend the widening cracks within its own 
ranks, along with other issues, led to military members from Eastern Nigeria deciding to 
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secede from Nigeria and establish the Republic of Biafra in 1967.193 The ensuing civil 
war saw the Nigerian military grow from its prewar size of 8,000 to 250,000 by 1970,194 
ultimately defeating Biafra. Continued unrest within the institution nonetheless led to 
several successive coups. Indeed, there were seven (not counting failed attempts) 
between 1966 and 1998,195 when Nigeria finally transitioned to civilian democratic rule.  
In the five decades since Nigeria’s independence, the military has served as the 
governments force of choice whenever it has faced uprisings that challenge the 
government. For example, in 1980, the GoN called upon the military to address the 
Maitatsine uprising. 196 Maitatsine, the nom de guerre of the sect’s leader, Alhaji 
Muhammadu Maroua (also known as Mohammed Marwa) stirred up religious unrest in 
Kano, northern Nigeria.197 Maitatsine drew inspiration from Abubakr Mahmud Gumi, 
who had previously revitalized Islamic “scholarship and activism” in the north, utilizing 
the narrative of Dan Fodio’s “Golden Era” of Nigerian Muslim self-determination.198 
The military aggressively pursued Maitatsine and his followers, resulting in his death and 
5,000 members of the sect, lending credence to the idea that the army should be turned to 
in such matters.199 
In 2006, Nigeria once again used its military to confront the threat posed by 
MEND.200 MEND consisted of several militant groups in the Niger Delta, an oil-rich 
region in southern Nigeria who “object to the environmental degradation and 
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underdevelopment of the region, and the lack of benefits the community has received 
from its extensive oil resources.”201 After several failed attempts to defeat MEND, the 
GoN negotiated a cease-fire and amnesty for the group in 2009. The cease-fire resulted in 
over 15,000 gunmen turning in their weapons and the GoN committing $1.3 billion to 
economic development packages in the Niger Delta.202 Although MEND has 
significantly reduced its attacks, it remains active in the Niger Delta. 
In 2011, the GoN set-up an internal JTF to address the BH threat.203 The JTF, 
also known as “Operation Restore Order” (JTORO), met with initial success, including 
“the September 2011 arrest of a top Boko Haram commander, Ali Saleh, and five 
accomplices in Maiduguri, BH’s spiritual capital.”204 In 2011, the JTF deployed 30,000 
Army, police and state security personnel to enforce a state of emergency and curfew in 
Borno, Yobe, Plateau, Niger and Adamawa states.205 The operation was somewhat 
successful, but the military’s inability to mount consistent offensives to ensure BH’s 
demise is a testament to BH’s resiliency and is indicative of the problems within the 
military establishment. 
This could also help explain why the Nigerian government has hired mercenaries. 
The New York Times confirmed reports of a senior Nigerian official admitting to the 
presence of South African mercenaries in the country to assist in the fight against BH. 
From what officials stated, South African mercenaries were remotely housed in 
Maiduguri and only conducted operations at night to prevent their presence from being 
widely known.206 By outsourcing the country’s internal security, Nigeria is confirming to 
the world the inadequacy of its military, causing Nigeria scholar, Paul Lubeck, to refer to 
the episode as “the destitution of Nigerian nationalism.”207 
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G. BOKO HARAM’S EFFECT ON THE NIGERIAN MILITARY 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Although Nigeria’s military has achieved moderate success, its indiscriminate use 
of force has alienated the population it is charged to protect, making it less effective than 
it could be. Its militaristic approach often results in civilian deaths, regardless of how 
much care is taken because separating the insurgents from the population is always 
difficult.208 For instance, a 2014 confrontation between BH and the JTF in Baga village, 
near Nigeria’s border with Cameroon, resulted in 187 civilian deaths and 77 injured in 
the crossfire. When interviewed, “Baga residents accused the JTF, not Boko Haram, of 
firing indiscriminately at civilians and setting fire to much of the fishing town.”209 Such 
disparaging actions run in stark violation of the Hobbesian social contract model where 
citizens give up their individual liberty for common security.210  
Woefully, these reports are not isolated, but are emblematic of a broader pattern. 
Some, like Daniel Agbiboa see a military whose legacy has been rooted in “arbitrariness, 
ruthlessness, brutality, vandalism, incivility, low accountability to the public and 
corruption.”211 Sadly, the government’s tactics of repression, extra-judicial killings, and 
arrest without trials have caused residents to become more scared of the police and the 
Army than of the insurgents.212 Frustrated, villages have formed their own self-defense 
forces to combat BH instead of rely on an untrustworthy military. These Civilian Joint 
Task Force (CJTF), or Yan Gora, track down BH members in their communities, whom 
they turn in to the state or often kill themselves.213  
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To combat the CJTF, BH has leaned on its messaging, releasing a video on March 
25, 2014 of Abubakr Shekau commanding his followers not to spare women, the elderly, 
mentally disabled, or false converts. BH then followed up with a heightened strategy of 
terrorizing entire villages.214 The barbarism associated with BH’s actionsspecifically, 
publicized executions and beheadingshave had their intended effect, resulting in 
reports of Nigerian soldiers shooting themselves, feigning illness or, even worse, 
defecting rather than engaging in open conflict with BH.215 In essence, BH’s impact on 
the military culture is such that external intervention is increasingly sought.  
The growing discontent and region wide frustration resulting from the Nigerian 
military’s failure to neutralize BH has energized the AU to take action. In February 2015, 
the AU’s Peace and Security Council deployed a 7,500 man Multi-National Joint Task 
Force (MNJTF) sourced from Benin, Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon to confront 
BH and assist with the associated humanitarian crisis. At the time of this writing, the AU 
is also seeking a U.N. security mandate to increase financial and logistical support to the 
MNJTF.216 The assistant secretary for the U.S. Bureau of African Affairs, Linda 
Thomas-Greenfield, has also offered training and technical assistance to the MNJTF 
troops explaining that “Boko Haram’s activity in the region is now a focal point for the 
United States.”217 If Linda Thomas-Greenfield’s claim is true, then the Nigerian military 
will benefit from the much-needed help it requires to combat BH effects and messaging. 
As of April 2015, the MNJTF had made considerable gains against BH, re-
gaining some key terrain previously under BH’s control, to include the town of Damasak 
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in Nigeria, which served as BH’s regional headquarters.218 Although the gains are 
encouraging, the mere fact that the Nigerian military, a once revered force in West 
Africa, has proven unable to solve what was initially a Nigerian problem, is telling. In 
fact, after seizing Damasak and waiting several days for relief from the Nigerian military, 
Chadian and Nigerien members of the MNJTF joked that the Nigerian military was 
uninvolved in the offensive due to fear.219 This perception is a far cry from that of a 
military once reputed to be the best in the region. 
To counter BH’s effect on the civilian populations of northern Nigeria, President 
Jonathan recently implemented the following initiatives: Presidential Initiative for 
Northeast Nigeria (PINE), a $25 million “Marshall plan” aimed at using government and 
private philanthropy to link security to social and economic interventions in northern 
Nigeria;220 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) initiatives focused on counter- 
radicalization, de-radicalization, and strategic communication; Almajiri Education 
Programs (AEP) aimed at ending the dependency of millions of Muslim children in the 
north, schooled under the Almajiri system and susceptible to radicalization;221 and the 
Safe School Initiative (SSI), whose primary goal is ensuring a safe learning environment 
in the northeast through the rehabilitation and reconstruction of schools in the wake of the 
abduction of the school girls from Chibok.222 The jury remains out on whether all of 
these reforms will have the desired effect. 
H. SUMMARY 
The on-going conflict between BH and the government is a zero-sum game that 
requires a serious strategy and commitment of resources to combat BH’s messaging. BH 
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has proven over its relatively short lifespan to be resilient and crafty in its ability to affect 
Nigeria’s ethnic, political, and military institutions. Its actions have frayed Nigeria’s 
social fabric by furthering the divide between Christians and Muslims, and even among 
Muslims. BH has also succeeded in exploiting gaps between the government and the 
population, and in weakening confidence in (and of) the military.  
The formation of the MNJTF by the AU will improve Nigeria’s odds against BH, 
but Nigeria will still bear the burden of addressing the core grievances that gave rise to 
BH in the first place. The offer of technical assistance from the U.S. government is also 
critical as it can potentially counter BH’s propensity to morph into a more sinister 
organization capable of achieving territorial sovereignty. We will explore this more in the 
next chapter. 
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IV. LEARNING FROM THE ISLAMIC STATE EXPERIENCE  
From your brother in Allah Abu Mohammad Abu Bakr Bin Mohammad 
Shekau The Imam of Jama’atu Ahlus Sunnah Lidda Awati Wal Jihad…we 
announce our alliance to the Caliph of Muslims, Abubakar Abu Bakr 
Ibrahim ibn Awad ibn Ibrahim al-Husseini al-Qurashi, and will hear and 
obey in times of difficulty and prosperity.223 
—Abubakr Shekau pledges bayat to the Islamic State 
March 7, 2015 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in late 2014, BH began a campaign of terror focused on capturing 
population centers within northern Nigeria, ostensibly to achieve a territorially sovereign 
Caliphate. This successful military effort later extended into under-governed regions of 
neighboring nations, first Cameroon, then Chad and Niger. BH acquired a contiguous 
land area of approximately 200,000 square miles, 224 roughly the size of the U.S. state of 
Missouri. Countless predominantly Muslim communities exist in the region, where BH 
has massacred many and forced others into sexual slavery or impressed militia service. 
BH has also imposed strict sharia law in accordance with the group’s radical ideology.  
These actions by BH parallel the abrupt rise of IS, and have led many Nigeria 
experts, political scientists, and journalists to suggest that BH began modeling its 
activities after the successes of the radical Salafist group in Iraq and Syria.225 Whether 
the group develops the organizational and material ability to govern captured regions akin 
to IS during 2014 and 2015 remains to be seen. However, BH has striven to achieve a 
Caliphate and exclusive sovereignty within the borders of not only Nigeria, but also 
neighboring Cameroon, Niger and Chad. Another impetus is the historical success some 
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separatist groups have achieved in gaining aspects of sovereignty that has then forced not 
only recognition from the governments they fought, but also from the international 
community.  
B. TERROR IN THE PURSUIT OF SOVEREIGNTY  
Terror is utilized by organizations as a means to promote fear within populations, 
for purposes of gaining political concessions and often achieving regime change. 
Consequently, much of the available literature analyzes the use of terror as a means to 
gain political recognition. Aggrieved groups throughout history have sought to achieve 
recognition, whether on ethnic, sectarian, or political grounds. Groups typically begin to 
seek recognition through non-violent movements, with the goal of forcing the state to 
address grievances.226 Those groups that seek sovereignty almost always transition to the 
use of violent means. This transition to violence may be coerced by internal or external 
agitators and consequently, the established government will attempt to swiftly and often 
violently suppress them.227  
Self-determination is the goal that drives groups to seek both political concessions 
and, in some cases, outright territorial sovereignty.228 The commonly observed 
coalescence of self-determination groups does not suggest that these groups are in turn a 
collective homogeneous grouping of a single aggrieved ethnic, sectarian or political 
collection, but are often a stratum of society that believes it is not expressed within the 
recognized governing majority.229  
The modern international system has evolved from the 1648 Treaty of 
Westphalia.230 Sovereign states are recognized within the international system as 
consisting of “bordered territory occupied by a settled population under effective and at 
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least to some extent civil—or civilized—government.”231 However, within these borders 
not all ethnic, sectarian and political groups have equal representation within the society. 
To the contrary, minorities often suffer a degree of “identity suppression” by governing 
groups.232 Minorities, and those with no power, actively resist assimilation into broader 
society. Instead, they seek autonomy.233  
The Treaty of Westphalia also created a system of states in which, as Max Weber 
describes the dynamic, rulers and ruled enter a contract where contributors receive a 
degree of representation and security from the state, and in turn, the state receives 
“voluntary obedience” from the population.234 According to Weber, this “voluntary 
obedience” from society lends the ruling entity the authority to maintain order and gain 
revenue through taxation; in exchange the population receives goods, services and 
protection.  
While Weber’s description of the state is ideal, Mancur Olson describes how 
rulers often behave by distinguishing the separation between “stationary and roving 
bandits.”235 Olson suggests “roving bandits” settle and seize terrain to become 
“stationary bandits.”236 Eventually, the stationary “bandit-turned-ruler” enters into a 
contract with society, or at least some members of society, whereby some profit from the 
goods protected by the regime have to go to support both the regime and its defense. 
Problems arise when the state fails to manage its recourses or these relationships 
appropriately.237 Then, as both Weber and Olsen acknowledge, the authority of the ruling 
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entity is no longer regarded as legitimate and members of society no longer remain 
acquiescent.  
Secessionist and irredentist groups have utilized both violent and political means 
to achieve complete or partial autonomy.238 What often begins as non-violent protest 
evolves into organized armed revolt, typically assisted by harsh suppression by the ruling 
or governing entity. As movements expand, the potential to achieve a degree of 
sovereignty increases. Depending on the nature of the grievances during revolt, the 
movement will either seek inclusion in the current or reformed government, or autonomy 
in the form of partial or total sovereignty.  
C. INCLUSION VERSUS EXCLUSION-SEEKING GROUPS 
This dynamic, we suggest, places rebel, insurgent and other groups at either end 
of the Sovereignty-Seeking Terror Organization or Inclusion-Seeking Terror 
Organization continuum. During the 20th century, several insurgent movements fit these 
typologies. The Irish Republic Army (IRA) and its political wing Sinn Fein, fought Great 
Britain nearly a century before it sought inclusion in the newly reformed Irish 
Government.239 Likewise, the Shia protectionist group Hezbollah successfully combated 
rival Lebanese separatist groups and the State of Israel, yet shifted its focus to eventually 
hold seats in the Lebanese parliament.240 Conversely, Euskandi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) 
and its political wing Harri Batasuna (HB), sought political and territorial separation from 
Spain, based on historic rights of autonomy or Fueros,241 the realization of which 
continues to elude the Basque people due to political disunity.242 Finally, Hamas 
represents one of the most powerful and legitimate military and political entity in the 
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isolated Gaza Strip,243 but is unable to achieve full autonomy from the State of Israel due 
its continued use of violence. In all of these cases, sovereignty and either political or 
ethnic recognition, or both, were key factors in the efforts to gain either political 
inclusion or complete political and often territorial exclusion from the existing state.  
The relationship between SSTO’s and ITO’s and the use of violent means to 
achieve political concessions is depicted in Figure 5. As the model illustrates, Inclusive 
groups seek an aspect of inclusion and representation within the established government. 
Conversely, exclusive groups seek complete separation, either symbolically or 
territorially, from the established government or regime. The star indicates the point at 
which groups begin to seek autonomy from the state. 
 
Figure 5.  Inclusion and Exclusion Seeking Terror Organization Continuum 
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Inclusive terror organizations seek a degree of representation within the 
established government or state structure. Many alienated groups initially seek inclusion, 
within a state system established through previous social unrest and subsequent 
reconstitution.244 Again, we see this with Hezbollah’s evolution from extremist 
organization to political party following the decades long Lebanese Civil War.245 This 
also describes the inclusion of Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Movement into the 
Irish Republic following the Belfast Accords in 1998.246 In each case, separatist groups 
coalesced during a period of national reunification. These groups began as single ethno-
sectarian aligned organizations, intent on establishing protected semi-autonomous regions 
within the defined borders of established state. The initial tactical goal of these groups 
was to form a separate society within the confines of the larger state, but they later 
refocused their efforts on injecting themselves into the established state. As a result, both 
Hezbollah and Sinn Fein sought political inclusion.  
In contrast, SSTOs persist in seeking a degree of exclusion, ranging from partial 
to full autonomy, from an existing state. Likewise, SSTOs seek to dominate a particular 
area, or what might be described as distinct and bounded terrain. For instance, while the 
Basque separatist group ETA sought political and territorial sovereignty in the Pyrenees 
region,247 the Palestinian group Hamas continue to seek the full independence of 
Palestine.248 In 1996, as a result of the civil war following the overthrow of the 
Communist Afghan regime under President Najibullah, the Taliban’s focus transitioned 
from violent upheaval to the provision of government services within the newly acquired 
country.249 As a result of seeking varying degrees of autonomy, each group regardless of 
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their position within the SSTO/ITO continuum, became responsible to provide services 
and representation to a broader, often cross-sectarian constituency.250  
D. “THE ISLAMIC STATE” AS AN EXCLUSIVE SSTO CALIPHATE 
SYSTEM 
The Caliphate that both BH and IS seek, we suggest, is a form of an exclusive 
SSTO. Both BH and IS have displayed a desire to establish a territorially distinct region 
where they can practice self-rule. IS, in particular, rejects the “apostate regimes” of 
neighboring Arab countries, and seeks the subsequent liberation of Muslim lands.251 
Again, this is not a new concept. In 1996, prior to his military campaign to seize 
Afghanistan, Mullah Omar declared himself the Caliph of all Muslims and Afghanistan 
the Emirate.252 In both cases, the Taliban and IS justified their actions by suggesting that 
apostate regimes do not adhere to the tenets of sharia law but instead accept the Western 
system of state sovereignty.253 Although a wide range of people, from politicians to 
theological experts, label IS and BH as “nihilistic” groups, focused on the use of violence 
for propaganda purposes and to achieve an apocalyptic vision, the groups do in fact 
adhere to an existing radical Salasfist Muslim ideology.254 Both groups agree that Islamic 
Lands, or “dar al-Islam,” must be acquired and defended militarily through violence 
waged within the Land of Jihad, “dar al-harb.”255 Although theological discrepancies 
exist when it comes to how to envision the modern Caliphate,256 both groups believe it is 
incumbent upon them to establish territorial sovereignty. As Stuart Elden suggests: 
There is therefore a crucial spatial element to ideals of Islamic political 
rule. This may operate within existing territorial boundaries, seek to 
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redraw them, or transcend them entirely into a more open regional or even 
global system.257 
To achieve this goal, IS seized large portions of north, west and central Iraq and 
portions of southwest Syria beginning in June 2014. This non-state actor’s aim has been 
to gain physical territory and to create an alternative government.”258 The charismatic 
and spiritual leader of IS, Abu-Bakr Al Baghdadi uses this vision to incite regional Jihad 
and lay claim to the resurrection of a regional Islamic Caliphate.259  
By late 2014, IS had captured towns along the Syria-Iraq border, establishing a 
“capital” within the Syrian city of Raqqa, as it continued to vie for control of larger Iraqi 
cities in the western province of Anbar. Although IS has had considerable military 
success and has subdued the inhabitants of conquered territories by applying brutal 
violence, ethnic cleansing, and engaging in the savage murder of members of captured 
Iraqi and Syrian forces, the organization has also advocated providing governmental 
infrastructure. Moreover, Abu-Bakr Al-Baghdadi has repeatedly emphasized “state-
building” in his rhetoric.260 IS has endeavored to institutionalize social grievance 
adjudication processes, seize infrastructure to acquire revenue and even attempted to 
create a state monetary system.  
E. THE BRIEF EVOLUTION OF IS 
“The Islamic State,” has adopted several identities since its inception during the 
U.S. war in Iraq.261 The group began by announcing itself as the “Islamic State of Iraq 
and Al Sham” (al Dawla al Islamiya fi al Iraq wa al Sham).262 The U.S. invasion of Iraq 
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attracted jihadis from other regions of conflict, notably a prominent native Jordanian Al-
Qaeda member named Abu Musab Al-Zarkawi (AMZ).263 Following the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) became the vanguard of the AQ-sponsored Iraqi 
insurgency.  
U.S.-led coalition efforts to dismantle remaining elements of the Ba’ath members 
from the government and military led to a security void.264 The Iraqi insurgency took 
advantage of this environment and AMZ’s newly formed organization targeted both 
coalition forces and segments of Iraqi society to create instability and to provoke 
sectarian conflict.265 AMZ’s initial terror campaign was conspicuously marked by video 
recorded executions of foreign contractors and takfirs, or non-believers.266 Its message 
was one of sectarian exclusivity; a tactic later adopted by its protégé group, IS.  
By June 2006, with AMZ’s terror campaign at fever pitch, coalition forces 
succeeded in killing the AQI commander during a successful special-operations-led air 
strike.267 This is when Abu-Bakr Al-Baghdadi’s predecessors, Abu Ayyub Al-Musri and 
Abu Omar Al Baghdadi renamed the organization “The Islamic State in Iraq” (ISI), and 
began to promote the group’s goal of Islamic self-determination.268 With Abu-Bakr Al-
Baghdadi, now elected as the leader of the organization in 2011, the group gained a much 
needed respite from coalition counter-terrorism efforts and proved able to reorganize 
under the cover of the chaos created by the growing civil conflict in Syria.269  
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The group took further advantage of the Syrian civil war to expand and reinvent 
itself as the “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.”270 Not surprisingly, the group’s rapid 
and forceful expansion put it in fierce competition with staunchly loyal Al-Qaeda 
affiliates, such as the Al-Nusra Front. Much of this friction was a result of conflicting 
ideologies; Al-Nusra favored a more cooperative approach to gaining territory alongside 
other separatist groups, as opposed to IS’s view of exclusive sharia based governance.271 
Ayman Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden’s successor, attempted to neutralize the conflict 
between the two groups. However, Al-Baghdadi rejected Zawahiri’s efforts, which 
eventually led to IS’s separation from Al-Qaeda.272 
As IS gained symbolically significant physical territory in Syria, as depicted in 
Figure 6, the group established its capital in the city of Raqqa, the historical location of 
the Abbasid Caliphate,273 in the northwest region of the war-ravished country.274 
Meanwhile, with the U.S.-led coalition’s very public and swift withdrawal from Iraq in 
2011, latent sectarian grievances again began to re-materialize in the Sunni-dominated 
western provinces of Iraq, a region where U.S. forces had previously worked with the 
Sons of Iraq during the Anbar Awakening.275 IS capitalized on Sunni grievances against 
the predominantly Shia government led by former Iraqi Prime Minister Noori Al-Maliki, 
whose government was perceived by many within the Iraqi Sunni population as having 
not adequately provided representation or distribution of services.276 The result presented 
an opportunity for IS to grow its insurgency among the aggrieved Sunni populations in 
Iraq.  
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Figure 6.  Regions Captured by IS during 2014 and 2015277 
F. “IS” AS A GOVERNING SSTO 
IS’s governing body is very sophisticated, comparable to that of established 
nation-states. Ironically much of IS upper echelon leadership have been widely connected 
to the Coalition Detention Center Camp Bucca, which operated during the U.S.-led war 
in Iraq.278 Abu-Bakr Al-Baghdadi himself was reportedly interned at the U.S. facility as a 
lower echelon member of the Iraqi insurgency.279 The three elements of the IS governing 
body: The Sharia Council, The Shura Council, and the Military Council, draw on the 
experience of former Ba’ath government and military figures, in addition to former AQI 
members.280 The combination of both former military and government officials and 
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experienced insurgents presented IS with the ability to draw from a wide range of 
experience.281 The fact that individuals from such divergent and formerly hostile 
backgrounds have joined forces seems a direct consequence of their shared internment in 
Camp Bucca, and other coalition internment camps.282 
Meanwhile, most of the territory recently acquired by IS has been in regions of 
Iraq where the state has failed to grant adequate representation to certain populations, or 
in the case of Syria, where there has been a complete deterioration of the state. From the 
outset of IS’s military campaign in Iraq and southern Syria, Abu Bakr-Al Baghdadi has 
stated that the organization seeks to create a governmental structure under the auspices of 
a “Caliphate” evocative of the “Four Rightly Guided [Sunni] Caliphs” who ruled over the 
newly established Islamic empire within the region until the 13th century.283 IS has 
justified its actions by following Salafist Islamic principles (dawa), whereby any entity 
resistant to its rule is deemed “apostate (murtad) or Infidel (kafir),” and is subsequently 
subject to “death, or taxation (jizya).”284 By basing its actions on these principles, IS 
presents itself as justified in the attempt to rule populations. 
With regard to governance, IS has established local governmental structures in 
captured cities, such as Aleppo and Mosul. Disregarding sub-populations, such as the 
Yazidis, Kurds, and Christians,285 IS has provided some grievance adjudication and rule 
of law. The Sharia council, one of IS’s three established councils, creates legislation and 
oversees enforcement of sharia law within occupied regions.286 Perhaps IS’s greatest 
benefit from the combination of rule of law and near exclusive utilization force has been 
the recognition of the organization as the only ruling authority in the regions it occupies. 
Syrian and Iraqi forces have achieved few decisive victories against IS. Likewise, 
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Kurdish groups have yet to completely defend against IS domination. Notably IS’s 
successes have emboldened its leadership and its members, and also convinces frightened 
skeptics that the organization is legitimate through the control considerable territory, if 
only through the use of uncontested force.  
G. STATE REVENUE  
In a quite brief period of time IS has become materially and monetarily wealthy. 
IS capitalized on seized assets from local inhabitants of occupied regions, captured 
military hardware following successful engagement against Iraqi and Syrian forces, and 
criminal enterprises. One of IS’s most notable initial criminal acts occurred after the 
successful and lucrative robbery of an Iraqi National Bank branch in Mosul.287 The 
robbery provided IS with a tremendous amount of capital with which to fund operations. 
However, this event also meant that IS did not mutually invest in market formation or 
management of a state’s assets.  
Early on IS sought to seize critical Iraqi infrastructure in areas, such as oil rich 
regions of northern Iraq. International organizations and scholars estimate that the daily 
revenue collection from oil attained by IS ranges between $1–2 million,288 which helped 
sustain the group through 2014. With this revenue collection, IS has attempted to 
implement more socially focused programs. Similarly, IS has created a system of taxation 
that closely resembles extortion. Taxes (Jizya), a level of extortion, have been leveled 
heavily against ruled populations. Likewise, IS has established a “Fighter Benefit 
Plan,”289 similar to Hezbollah’s Martyrdom Foundation,290 which provides payments to 
the families of IS fighters killed in combat. As previously mentioned, IS publicizes and 
welcomes the emigration of foreign professionals (hijrah), ranging from medical field 
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workers and social workers to teachers and intellectuals.291 Assuming that IS takes 
greater care with its finances, “The Islamic State” should be able to increasingly provide 
some of the same services as a functioning government. 
H. MEDIA AND MESSAGING 
IS’s terror campaign has been well publicized thanks to its internationally 
broadcast acts of violence, from the beheadings of Western journalists in 2014 to the 
immolation of a captured Jordanian pilot in 2015.292 Media operations remain a 
foundation of IS’s campaign to frightening Western audience, legitimizing and justifying 
their extremist Salafist ideology, and aiding in the recruiting of new members.293 IS 
maintains a sizable following on social media platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook, 
which are largely managed by foreign sympathizers.294 Much like Hezbollah’s Al-Manar 
news agency,295 IS created similar English subtitled platforms, such as the Al-Hayat 
news station and the Islamic State News printed publication and magazine dabiq,296 
whose primary focus is intimidating the West. Of course, these media operations also 
help inspire potential recruits and serve as models for groups, such as BH, when it comes 
to refining their otherwise crude media efforts.297  
Another pragmatic use of media operations is a means to decentralize IS’s vast 
support network while still remaining highly connected. Similarly, it can professionalize 
its military wing through the collection and presentation of tactical documents 
available.298 This professionalization of the organization’s military wing, coupled with 
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ideological fervor, has aided IS’s continued tactical successes against U.S.-trained Iraqi 
forces throughout mid-to-late 2014 and into 2015. 
I. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND “STATE” FAILURE 
IS has made a more than concerted effort to alienate neighboring states and, more 
conspicuously, Western states. In Daqib magazine, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi 
unambiguously threatens to bring about an apocalyptic “end of days” struggle against the 
West.299 Given, military targeting of U.S.-backed Iraqi government forces, and the 
documented murder of five international journalists, an aid worker, and a captured 
coalition pilot, IS has proven to be unwilling to participate in negotiations or in the 
international system. IS, as of the writing of this research, continues to try to seize 
Kurdish regions in northern Iraq, most notably the village of Kobani and outlying areas 
of Mosul, to rid the region of ethnic groups in which the organization deems 
undesirable.300  
The deplorable human rights abuses conducted by IS not only in these well-
documented cases, but also its daily prosecution of its skewed version of rule of law, 
demonstrate IS’s lack of desire to comply with any aspects of international law. Some 
theorize that the instability that IS exploited to rapidly gain and govern territory will 
prove to be its eventual undoing.301 This argument assumes that if the international 
community continues to pressure IS, both economically and militarily, and helps support 
a legitimate alternative to IS, then IS will not continue to expand, gain revenue and 
continue to rule. However, as of 2015, IS has not shown signs of imminent decline. Nor 
has the Iraqi Government displayed the capacity to provide an alternative to IS’s brutal 
yet effective brand of governing.  
Given IS’s success in Iraq and Syria, we have to consider if BH and its rapid rise 
in northern Nigeria and neighboring regions of Chad, Niger and Cameroon could follow a 
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similar trajectory. IS has impacted U.S. national interests in the Middle East, in so much 
as the United States has expended tremendous resources and promoted a coalition air 
campaign to counter the organization.302 U.S. policy reflects the elevated threat that IS 
(or ISIL, as it is called in the 2015 National Security Strategy) presents to U.S. national 
interests and the existential threat it poses to its allies in the region.303 We suggest that IS 
presents an important threat to U.S. national interests based on the assessment of U.S. 
national interests discussed in Chapter III. This is largely due to the fact that IS’s efforts 
in 2014–2105 destabilize Iraq, a nation that the U.S. government and military spent over 
a decade to stabilize. 
J. BOKO HARAM AS AN SSTO CALIPHATE SYSTEM, GIVEN THE “IS 
EXPERIENCE” 
Although BH is mentioned in the NSS published in February 2015, the 
organization is not treated with the same gravity as its comparable Levantine 
organization.304 Nevertheless, given the impact of IS on stated U.S. national interests and 
regional security in the Middle East, one has to ask whether BH might not have similar 
impacts in west Africa?  
In August 2014, BH proclaimed the establishment of the Caliphate in the captured 
regions of Borno State, and continued to expand into surrounding regions of northern 
Nigeria, as illustrated in Figure 7.305 Abubakr Shekau announced that the Caliphate was 
established to free Muslim lands from GoN and subsequently, the Caliphate refuses to 
“recognize the State of Nigeria.”306 However, this announcement deviated from the 
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previously stated goal of uniting all of Nigeria under Islamic sharia law.307 One major 
difference between BH and IS is that BH exists in the failing seams of states with 
marginal to well functioning governments and militaries. Likewise, BH’s success during 
2014 to acquire territory was as much of a surprise to the organization as it was to nations 
within the regions and the international community. BH has not displayed either the 
ability or the desire to govern to the extent that IS has proven to be successful. Finally, it 
has provoked a coalition response from neighboring countries, which in contrast to Iraq 
and Syria, have not been destabilized by years of civil war and sectarian conflict.  
BH’s violent actions against the Nigerian state have been widely categorized as 
mere acts of terror since 2009. Boko Haram’s ideology and rhetoric suggests its desire to 
not only destabilize the Nigerian state, but to similarly achieve an “...independent and just 
state devoid of anything haram (ungodly or sinful).”308 This statement made by Boko 
Haram founder Mohammad Yusuf further suggests that Boko Haram ultimately seeks a 
space or territory independent of rule by the secular GoN.  
                                                 
307 Grossman and Joscelyn, “Boko Haram Focuses on Seizing Territory.” 
308 Mohammad Yusuf quoted in Abimbola Adisoji, “The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic 
Revivalism in Nigeria,” Africa Spectrum 45, no. 2 (2010): 98. 
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Figure 7.  Regions Captured by BH throughout 2014 and 2015.309 
K. BH AS A GOVERNING SSTO 
Throughout 2014 into 2015, BH achieved shocking military successes in northern 
Nigeria, seizing several towns, such as Maiduguri, and sparse villages within Yobe, 
Borno and Adamawa states. These regions were captured with relative ease due to 
minimal to non-existent government presence. Through a campaign of ethno-sectarian 
cleansing, particularly of non-Muslim and Christian minorities in the north, the group 
focused on the brutal establishment of sharia law. The Chibok School Girls mass 
abduction is one of the more irrational acts taken by the group—since BH claims to a 
safe-haven for Islamic culture—yet the group has purposely destabilized Nigerian 
Muslim communities. Much like Al-Qaeda’s treatment of early elements of IS, Abubakr 
Shekau was rebuked by founding members of Mohammad Yusuf’s movement due to his 
unrestricted use of violence.310 This unrestricted use of violence limits the group’s ability 
                                                 
309 David Blair, “Boko Haram Is Now a Mini-Islamic State, with Territory of Its Own,” The 
Telegraph, January 10, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/ 
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310 John Campbell, “U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram,” Council on Foreign Relations, 9, 
November 2014, http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/us-policy-counter-nigerias-boko-haram/p33806. 
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to secure a legitimate base among the populations of captured regions, and furthers the 
group’s inability to achieve its stated goal of creating a sovereign Islamic state.  
L. STATE REVENUE 
BH’s violent campaign has displaced nearly 2 million people from communities 
in northern Nigeria and bordering regions of Chad, Niger and Cameroon.311 Although 
BH has claims to offer social programs to support the remaining inhabitants of these 
captured regions, the group instead taxes and extorts.312 Ransom received from the 
repatriation of a handful of foreign captives has yielded the group several thousand in 
U.S. dollars.313 However, the group has not found a consistent revenue source, unlike IS, 
which controls a large portion of the oil trade in northern Iraq. This is in part due to BH’s 
inability to access to the oil rich southern region of Nigeria.  
BH does maintain checkpoints to control the flow of commerce into and out of 
regions it has captured. These checkpoints serve as yet another means of extorting 
civilians, impressing new fighters, and affecting the broader Nigerian economy314 
because most inhabitants of northern Nigeria subsist by agrarian means. BH’s campaign 
has caused communities to miss harvests, one effect of which has been the drastic 
inflation of food prices and mass starvation.315 Although these efforts seemingly support 
BH activities, in contrast to that of IS, the effects of the BH insurgency does not create 
conditions to promote the sustained revenue stream required to support a large 
organization intent on controlling and maintaining territory.  
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M. LEGITIMACY OF THE CALIPHATE IN AFRICA AND ALLEGIANCE 
TO IS 
Although increasingly ideologically linked, BH has been argued to resemble more 
of a violent social movement, devoid of the centralized leadership structure that is evident 
in the highly structured’ IS system.316 Due to BH’s lack of mature leadership council 
structure, the group has previously clung to more established Jihadi groups; primarily Al-
Qaeda affiliates, such as AQIM.317 The newest pledge of bayat by BH to IS has been 
argued to be the latest in BH attempts to gain support and legitimacy the organization 
perceives it is lacking.318 The lack of support BH received from AQ—and in turn, the 
patron group’s support of BH rivals, such as Ansaru—serve as factors that pushed the 
organization to depart from its original claim of support.319 As opposed to AQ, IS offers 
financial support and emissaries to professionalize affiliated groups.320  
BH cannot ignore the military success of IS, and the organization’s desires to 
emulate similar success in Africa.321 A natural progression for an organization that has 
achieved rapid progress, but cannot support the gains of its military campaign, is to 
receive external support. This is evident in the evolution of groups, such as Hezbollah, 
which arguably would not have survived the post-Lebanese Civil War era without the 
support of the Iranian and Syrian regimes.322 
Given AQ’s inconsistent support of BH, and IS’s offers of financial and 
institutional assistance, it makes sense that BH subsequently pledged bayat to IS. In 
return for BH’s bayat, IS receives a willing affiliate and moves closer to its stated goal of 
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expanding the Caliphate into Africa, Asia and parts of southern Europe.323 Not only does 
BH’s claim legitimize IS’s specific brand of Caliphate governing systems, it also further 
pushes AQ loyal affiliates into the periphery.324 As BH struggles to become an effective 
organization, the potential welcoming of more seasoned administrators from IS presents a 
pragmatic move for the organization.325 
N. BH AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM—POTENTIAL FACTORS OF 
DECLINE 
As with IS, BH has fully rejected the international system and fundamentally 
rejected the existing system of government within Nigeria. As observed in the cases of 
Sinn Fein, Hezbollah and to a degree ETA and HB, the ability for SSTOs and ITOs to 
transition to political dialogue greatly enhanced the group’s likelihood of attaining some 
dimensions of self-determination. However, these groups projected a degree of governing 
power or at least parity for popular support with the governments in which they were 
combatting. BH does not maintain this advantage. As of early 2015, the MNJTF launched 
a relentless military campaign focused on the recapture of population centers seized by 
BH the previous year.326 As BH’s hold on seized areas grows more tenuous—due to the 
group’s inability to effectively govern—with the growing intensity of coalition military 
efforts, it is unlikely the organization will achieve or maintain the exclusionary status it 
initially intended to achieve. 
Hakeem O. Yusuf, Law Professor and author of Boko Haram studies, suggests 
that a source of ethno-political grievance stimulating societies that revolt is the 
“governance gap” existing between the government and sub-portions of populations.327 
In essence, governments fail to recognize or redistribute goods and services to certain 
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sub-populations, and in return underrepresented portions of the society become 
“disconnected” from the state.328 Yusuf argues that such a dynamic has existed in Nigeria 
since the country received independence from Great Britain in the 1960s.329 Nigeria’s 
rapid economic growth has not been equally distributed to northern Nigerian populations, 
and as a result Yusuf argues, the population in the north began to “disconnect” from the 
rest of the country.330 Successful separatist groups typically provide services to fill the 
void created by the “governance gap” and in return, gain credibility and authority within 
the population. As witnessed in 2015, BH has not measured up in this regard. 
Yusuf argues that at the beginning of the BH insurgency, the group focused on 
several social programs intended to provide basic services to populations in northern 
Nigeria previously neglected by the government.331 However, the atrocities committed 
against the civilian population during BH’s 2014–2015 campaign prove the organization 
has since distanced itself from offering social programs. BH failed to seize the 
opportunity to fill the “governance gap” created by the GoN’s inability to become a 
“stationary bandit”332 and provide equitable wealth and service distribution in the north. 
In essence, BH actions make it akin to the GoN in failing to provide for the population in 
the north. But rather than acting as a “stationary bandit, BH has remained a “roving 
bandit,”333 which added to the overall humanitarian crisis in northern Nigeria and further 
prevented the group from achieving sovereignty.334 Although, if BH became an effective 
“stationary bandit” and restricted the use of violence against civilians and implemented 
social services, this would potentially increase the threat it would pose to the state of 
Nigeria and U.S. interests. The inability of the GoN to similarly behave as an effective 
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“stationary bandit” presents perhaps the greatest obstacle to fully defeating the root 
causes of the BH insurgency.  
O. SUMMARY 
Boko Haram and the Islamic State of Iraq and As-Sham represent the most recent 
examples concept of exclusive SSTOs. Adherence to a narrative rooted in radical Salafist 
ideology and invoking the ancient, celebrated age of Islamic Caliphate rule in the Middle 
East and Africa have presented a means of attracting membership and legitimizing both 
movements. However, at the root of BH and IS efforts to establish a Caliphate is the 
desire to bring about a sovereign environment in which to rule. As of 2015, IS has 
acquired territory carved from the failing regimes of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria and 
Haidar Al-Abadi in Iraq.335 BH has attempted to gain similar autonomy, but has 
ultimately failed to provide services for the populations that inhabit its newly acquired 
territory. Likewise, the government of Goodluck Jonathan, now inherited by 
Muhammadu Buhari as of 2015, is far from failing or willing to cede large portions of 
territory to a separatist organization.  
The adhesive that helps keep an SSTO and ITO from collapsing is the legitimacy 
it gains from constituent populations. This legitimacy is earned from the group’s ability 
to provide services and protection to the population. The social service aspects of 
governing ensure the organizations survival and ability to remain sovereign, as witness 
by the success of groups, such as Hezbollah. While BH has signaled its aspiration to 
achieve a degree of autonomy and territorial exclusivity, as of 2015, BH has proven 
unable or unwilling to provide services to populations in northern Nigeria. This fact, 
coupled with the external pressure from the governments affected by the insurgency, will 
likely set in motion BH’s temporary decline. Without considerable efforts by the GoN to 
reclaim the territory and populations of northern Nigeria from BH influence, the 
insurgency or similar movements will likely reemerge.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Each of those three independently, I think, presents a significant threat not 
only in the nations in which they primarily operate but regionally and…to 
the United States. Those three organizations [Boko Haram, AQIM, and Al 
Shabaab] have very explicitly and publicly voiced an intent to target 
Westerners and the U.S. specifically…If left unaddressed, then you could 
have a network that ranges from East Africa through the center and into 
the Sahel and Maghreb, and I think that would be very, very worrying.336 
—Former AFRICOM Commander General Carter Ham 
A. THESIS SUMMARY 
Without question, the United States faces myriad challenges and obligations in its 
role as a global hegemon. It is for this reason that the need to prioritize national power as 
a means to implement a designated policy or strategy is crucial. Furthermore, the U.S.’s 
obligations in Africa are complex, made more so with the establishment of AFRICOM in 
2007 and its unique soft power mandate. Yet, the relations formed between AFRICOM 
and partner countries in Africa and beyond have become critically important to fighting 
the Global War on Terror in Africa, which brings us back to BH. The organization is 
predominantly focused on domestic attacks but also maintains relations with AQ and IS, 
each of which says it will target the United States. How seriously should the United 
States take the threat that BH poses? Is it even the U.S.’s responsibility to tackle the BH 
problem when Nigeria is more than capable of doing so on its own, if it truly desired to? 
Among the challenges presented by the BH insurgency, Nigeria is a fragile state 
with failed governance, unprecedented poverty, endemic corruption, a deteriorating 
military, and a protracted ethnic and religious conflict in the Nigerian middle belt. Even 
though Nigeria successfully held quasi-peaceful presidential elections in March 2015, BH 
has and will continue to take center stage until its grievances are properly addressed or 
ultimately rendered moot. BH has claimed over 13,000 lives and displaced over a million 
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others while striving to accomplish its goals of removing the current political structure 
and its Western supports, while implementing sharia law across Nigeria.  
The goal of this thesis has been to highlight how BH’s persistence and expansion 
could threaten the critical interests of the United States in Nigeria and neighboring states. 
In doing so, we borrowed a continuum of intensities against which U.S. core interests can 
be weighed. These intensities (existential, vital, important, and peripheral) clarify the 
nature of the threat potential enemies pose and aid in prioritizing resources required to 
defeat the threat. Using this lens, we can measure BH’s strategic impact on the United 
States.  
This assessment is crucial given BH’s effects on Nigeria’s economic, ethnic, 
political, and military infrastructure. Through crafty propaganda that exploits violence, 
BH has used videos of beheadings to advance its sovereignty-seeking goals while 
simultaneously exposing the weaknesses in the GoN. More importantly, BH is forcing 
not only Nigeria, but also the larger global order to consider the core grievances that 
helped BH rise so rapidly. Endemic corruption and resulting economic disparities 
between the “haves” and “have nots” have paralyzed the GoN, confirming the belief of 
many that defeating BH is too monumental a task for the GoN.  
Consequently, U.S., British, French, and Canadian forces have deployed to 
Nigeria to serve in an advisory capacity. Nigeria’s neighbors have also been forced into 
major roles in the fight against BH. Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, frustrated with the 
Nigerian military’s lethargic response, now form the nucleus of the JTF, which is having 
a modicum of success as of the time of this writing. The JTF has wrested territory from 
BH’s control and forced the organization to adapt or be defeated. As a result, BH swore 
bayat to the IS in March 2015, becoming the largest terror organization to date to do 
so.337 It is still unclear what this relationship means or what the outcome of the 
relationship will be. However, IS sponsorship is likely to bring about an increase in 
funding and recruitment for BH. 
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BH and the IS share certain similarities, the most important being their desire for 
sovereignty. This desire further supports their classification as SSTOs, meaning, that they 
have goals beyond simply accomplishing acts of terror. Both have gravitated to carving 
out a new space for themselves rather than seeking inclusion within an existing state. 
Exclusive SSTOs often prey on under-governed spaces characterized by political, ethnic, 
and economic marginalization. As a result, they turn this territory into a petri dish for 
similar-minded separatists to gather and share radical ideological beliefs aimed at 
disrupting the establishment of a secure world order, one of the U.S.’s core national 
interests.  
B. BH AS A THREAT TO U.S. ECONOMIC INTERESTS 
BH’s impact on Nigeria’s economic environment and that of its neighbors is 
significant. By ensuring insecurity in northern Nigeria, BH has stimulated a decline in the 
educational, commercial, and employment infrastructure. As a result, agriculture has 
suffered as skilled farmers flee to safer locations. The tourism industry has also taken a 
major hit. However, these issues by themselves do not seem significant enough to affect 
U.S. economic interests in Nigeria considering that the most important resource to both 
countries is oil/petroleum products, which remains safely protected within the confines of 
southern Nigeria and away from BH. Additionally, although the United States relies on 
Nigeria’s BH-affected neighbors for cocoa, wood, and rubber, the amount of these goods 
exported to the United States is so miniscule that the average American would hardly feel 
their loss.  
In this sense and from a U.S. centric point of view, BH’s impact on Nigeria’s 
economy is too small as yet to be a major concern. As long as Nigeria’s oil continues to 
flow, the United States has little to worry about. However, were the situation to worsen 
and drive Nigeria far from being the U.S.’s 8th largest exporter, the level of concern 
would surely rise. Likewise, from a Nigerian perspective, if FDIs continue to remain as 
high as they were in 2013 ($21 billion), Nigeria should remain capable of weathering the 
BH storm. However, were the FDI numbers to drop dramatically, the government would 
be forced to take immediate action to restore the faith of its foreign investors. Overall, 
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economically, from these perspectives, the threat posed by BH is probably at best 
considered peripheral. 
C. BH AS A THREAT TO REGIONAL STABILITY 
Nigeria’s unwillingness to defeat BH at its inception has resulted in BH’s 
emergence as a threat to regional stability in West Africa. As a consequence, Cameroon, 
Chad, Niger, and the larger AU have joined Nigeria to form the MNJTF to combat BH’s 
advance. The AU has to be concerned that BH has the ability to incite and exploit ethnic 
rivalries and destabilize economies via the refugee problems it has created. With BH’s 
recent alliance with IS, neighbors also have to worry about jihadists travelling to Nigeria. 
Such a situation could exacerbate the crisis beyond just Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and 
Nigeria. In light of this possibility, BH presents an important threat to U.S. interests. 
D. BH AS A THREAT TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS  
The Center for Naval Analyses proposes four potential trajectories the conflict in 
Nigeria can take. The trajectories are listed as: devolution to criminality or terrorism; 
expansion and secession; fracture and co-option; and civil war.338 As an addition, we 
posit a fifth trajectory characterized by sponsorship that increases the ranks, resources, 
and territory controlled by BH. Should BH travel down this path to ‘stationary banditry’ 
it is likely to lead to increased attacks on U.S. interests and citizens in Nigeria, with the 
goal of forcing international recognition—like IS—and causing the United States to have 
to enact similar policies to ensure BH’s ultimate defeat. 
In sum, examining BH through the lens of existential, vital, important, and 
peripheral interests, we would position BH in its current state to the far right side of the 
continuum, meaning that BH currently represents a peripheral threat to U.S. interests due 
to its inability to mobilize effective mass support. BH’s use of heavy-handed tactics, as 
well as its alienation of other Muslims, may have contributed to its failings. However, 
were conditions to change and should BH embark on the trajectories listed above, then 
here is what we predict:  
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If BH chooses the criminality trajectory, it will remain a peripheral threat to the 
United States. This assertion is supported by the recent success of the MNJTF, which is 
likely to severely weaken BH’s effectiveness in the region, reducing the likelihood of a 
negotiated settlement, and forcing BH to live on the fringes of society. Such a scenario 
will reduce BH’s impact on Nigeria and its neighbors, as well as the need for continued 
U.S. intervention.339 
Expansion and Secession is likely if BH undergoes a leadership change or 
reforms its violent tactics. Such a course of action, coupled with failure by the GoN to 
address BH’s core grievances may ignite a spark that builds mass support for BH. If this 
were to occur, the potential for BH to legitimize its claim of being an Islamic State would 
become more plausible.340 In this scenario, BH will achieve its goals as an SSTO, 
elevating the threat level it poses to others from peripheral to important on the intensity 
scale, since it would then present a successful model for secessionists elsewhere. 
With the Fracture and Co-optation, the momentum gained from the MNJTF’s 
success would force BH to either seek a negotiated settlement with the state, or would 
provoke a splintering into smaller radical groups, which could potentially become more 
dangerous than BH. Ansaru has already displayed the propensity to stray from BH’s 
radical ideology in its disagreement with BH over BH’s attacks on other Muslims. Thus, 
if the MNJTF continues to achieve success, the potential to convince less belligerent 
members into negotiations is highly likely.341 If the insurgency were to fracture, it would 
likely either evolve into a criminal organization or be decisively defeated, and as such 
would become more of a peripheral threat to U.S. interests. 
Civil War is the least likely trajectory, but is possible if BH can exploit and take 
greater advantage of the complex ethno-religious conflicts, power politics, and economic 
disparities plaguing Nigeria. By preventing the Nigerian military from having a 
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monopoly on the use of force342 and by reducing the government’s ability to govern, BH 
could place Nigeria on the path to civil war. If the policies of the incoming Buhari 
administration resemble those of the Jonathan administration, this might become more 
likely. If this situation were to occur, BH could gain credibility by proving the GoN to be 
ineffective, thereby ensuring increased regional instability. This path would place U.S. 
interests in the region at risk, allowing the United States to classify BH as an important 
threat to its interests.  
A more ominous outcome is possible if BH’s alliance with IS amounts to one in 
which best practices are shared between both organizations. Specifically, if BH were to 
receive administrative assistance, funding, and recruitment by jihadists who deem Iraq 
and Syria too far to travel to, but who are interested in playing a role in securing the 
Caliphate, BH could present a more credible threat to U.S. interests. In this situation, we 
should expect an increased number of attacks on Western interests through the activation 
of BH’s sleeper cells in northwestern Nigeria,343 prompting the United States to commit 
more resources to facilitate BH’s demise as it is currently doing with the IS. If this were 
to come to fruition, BH would arrive at the zenith of the SSTO journey as a stationary 
bandit and would pose a vital threat to U.S. interests in the region. See Figure 8 for an 
illustration of how U.S. core interests interact with these intensities and trajectories. 
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Figure 8.   Boko Haram as a Threat to U.S. National Interests 
E. PREVENTING A WORSENING SITUATION 
Because the BH situation continues to unfold, it is necessary to conceive of stop-
gaps or actions the United States should consider undertaking to prevent the situation 
from fluctuating on the intensity scale as depicted above. In Figure 9, we have placed 
these stop-gaps where they are most likely to be needed to prevent the situation in 
Nigeria from worsening. These stop-gaps are intended to suggest to those interested in a 
positive resolution to the conflict in Nigeria what they can proactively do and how best to 
anticipate and pre-empt BH’s actions. These stop-gaps include but are not limited to the 
following. 
 Increase economic, diplomatic and military engagement with the GoN 
 Assist the Nigerian government to address core grievances in northern 
Nigeria  
 Disarm, demobilize, re-integrate less belligerent members of BH 
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 Expand existing counter-radicalization programs to counter the spread of 
extremist ideology 
 Address refugee and humanitarian concerns caused by the BH insurgency 
 Enhance military-to-military relationships to foster training, advising, and 
equipping 
 Increase coordination with the AU to ensure nested goals 
 Influence the incoming Buhari government to be a more inclusive 
government 
 Establish U.S. special operations forces (SOF) regional forward base in 
West Africa 
 Synchronize international and regional efforts 
 Actively target BH leaders to deny them safe havens 
 Consider committing limited number of conventional forces to protect 
security interests 
 Assist the Nigerian government to identify and prosecute BH sponsors, to 
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Figure 9.  Boko Haram and the Relationship between U.S. Core Interests, 
Intensities, Trajectories, and Stop-gaps. 
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F. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The BH insurgency has grown in the span of nearly a decade from an innocuous 
localized religiously-based movement in northern Nigeria to a surprisingly successful 
guerrilla organization. The military coalition of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad has 
had some success in degrading BH and reversing its rapid expansion, organizational 
scope, and territory. Muhammadu Buhari’s 2015 election to the office of the presidency 
has so far been a welcome relief to Nigerians who formerly despaired over the possibility 
of change. 
Without observable changes implemented by the incoming Buhari government as 
of this writing (June 2015), it is impossible for us to gauge accurately the effect of this 
change in political leadership. However, the United States now has gained the 
opportunity to restructure future U.S.-Nigerian relations via renewed engagement efforts, 
and to focus these efforts on aligning U.S. security and economic interests with those of 
the newly formed government.  
To accomplish this, it is imperative that the U.S. government emphasize 
engagement efforts that will reinforce the stop-gaps identified. Although not exhaustive, 
the proposed stop-gaps not only promote increased regional engagement for the U.S. 
government, but also help identify what the GoN needs to do. The United States should 
continue to help coordinate as necessary with the European Union (EU), North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), and AU to ensure a coordinated approach is applied. Last, 
severing BH’s links to IS and other jihadist groups like AQIM and Al-Shabaab is critical. 
By doing so, the United States can then both strengthen its relationship with the lion of 
Africa while simultaneously preventing BH from becoming a larger regional threat than it 
already is.  
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